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Abstract
This research develops a framework for reconciling expert opinions of component lifetimes and
empirical failure data to predict powertrain failure probabilities for Asset Management decision
making purposes. Using probability models of component failures, fleetwide dispatch and
component replacement history along with a large hydroelectric utility’s powertrain expert
elicitation we propose a four use cases. The first use case enables a more detailed calculation of
average component life. The second use case provides risk managers the ability to understand
how dispatch affects the risk of a single component failure. The third and fourth use cases
enables the recommendation of the distribution of generation dispatch at a 2-unit and a 4-unit
facility to maximize the reliability of all of the facilities modelled powertrain components for a
given timeframe. The third use case uses this information in a historical sense to develop a
Reliability Index while the fourth use case recommends future dispatch. Three historic operating
years will establish constraints to the future operating scenarios used to assess powertrain risk.
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1. Introduction
The proposed research will explore important aspects of hydroelectric powertrain reliability as a
function of unit dispatch patterns. The answers to the proposed research questions enable plant
owners to choose optimal strategies to maximize reliability, availability and value of the
hydroelectric powertrain. The physical scope defines the components covered by the powertrain
model. This research is significant as the hydroelectric industry aims to remain a leader in
reliable operations as it becomes increasingly burdened by grid fluctuations.

1.1. Problem Statement
This research addresses four Research Questions (RQ’s) that focus on four different use cases for
probabilistic powertrain reliability models. By developing a framework for our probabilistic
powertrain reliability model we can show the sensitivity of the answers to these RQ’s as a
function of the failure distribution function, current component ages and the expected dispatch
patterns.
x

x
x

x

Research Question 1 (RQ1) asks to what extent additional start-stop cycling decreases the
strategic life of three powertrain components: the thermoset stator windings, rotor
windings and Kaplan turbine runner.
Research Question 2 (RQ2) asks how unit dispatch patterns affect the risk of failure of a
single component
Research Question 3 (RQ3) asks how the reliability of actual distribution of dispatch
patterns compare to the reliability of the optimal distribution of dispatch patterns and the
least reliable distribution of dispatch patterns
Research Question 4 (RQ4) asks how optimal unit dispatch patterns for plant reliability
are affected by four distinct parameter vectors at a 4-unit facility and a 2-unit facility.

1.2. Scope
Fleet wide operations data and simulated outage events from Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
will provide a data driven approach to probability of failure. Due to data scarcity, most plant
owners only use their specific data and/or expert opinions to guide reliability decisions. The
hydropower expert elicitation hosted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) Risk
Management Center and Hydropower Analysis Center provides knowledge from many industry
participants for use at Corps facilities. Simulated failure data and the expert estimates will
combine to estimate three distinct parameter vectors that will be compared against the expert
only case in the sensitivity analyses.
The physical scope of the model encompasses the hydroelectric powertrain, defined broadly as
the turbine, generator, exciter, governor, transformer, and circuit breaker. Cyclic stresses affect
certain component more than other components. These components will be analyzed first since
their results will have greater impact on decision makers. Components that fit this description
are stator windings, rotor windings, turbine runner, generator output breaker, wicket gate shear
1

pins, wicket gate bushings, and generator step up (GSU) transformers. However, the expert
elicitation excluded both wicket gate components and therefore they will not be analyzed at this
time. The scope is further narrowed specifically to the stator windings, rotor windings and
turbine runner for the extent of this research although future work will include more components.
Reliability is defined as the probability that the component will operate as required for of a given
horizon time while availability is the percent of calendar time the unit is able to operate.
Recognizing the prevalent failure mechanisms and optimizing maintenance strategies can
improve reliability and availability. Important to asset management decision makers is the
concept of conditional reliability defined as the probability that the component will operate as
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬǡǡ .
required for future time ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ
ܻܱܧǡǡ given that it has already operated as required for time ܻܱܧ
The Weibull distribution is one tool analysts can use to understand how these failure mechanisms
and dispatch patterns affect system reliability and availability.
Each component must be analyzed individually before being combined into a series of
components where each component must be functioning for the unit to function (1). The current
analysis framework requires an expert elicitation to provide useful parameter estimates to the
model to be used in conjunction with unit failure data. Therefore, this model will be limited to
those components discussed by the Corps expert elicitation or future elicitations.

1.3. Significance of Study
This research looks to narrow the knowledge gap in several of the research opportunities outlined
in the DOE Hydropower Vision document released in July 2016. Notably it will aid in the:
x

x

x

“Development of best practices and justification for acquiring, validating, archiving,
analyzing and securing hydropower dispatch, cost, maintenance, condition
monitoring, and performance data to maximize hydropower value” (2).
“Understanding and creating parameters for the correlations and causalities among
flexible hydropower dispatch, reliability, and O&M costs, and integrating such
information into scheduling and planning processes” (2).
“Development of risk-based analytics to measure and manage hydropower reliability
and hydropower scheduling” (2).

Hydropower provides rapid response to changes in grid power demand improving overall grid
stability and preventing grid collapses due to voltage deviation. The varying modes of operation
of hydroelectric plants, the ancillary services they provide to the grid, their dispatch patterns and
market forces result in an intricate reliability optimization problem. The value of this
optimization is dependent upon a significant difference in the cost of forced outages compared to
planned outages. Reliability studies are becoming more significant as owners are cautious of
how wind power penetration may affect hydroelectric dispatch patters. Wind power penetration
affects the grids’ need for ancillary services and the spatial distribution of hydroelectric plants,
2

wind power farms and power demand, and the hydroelectric plants Mode of Operation (MOP)
determine which units are affected the most.
Wind integration studies concur that the forecast error of the net load, defined as grid load minus
wind power, is greater than the forecast error of the load as seen in Figure 1-1 because the wind
power forecast error is greater than the grid load forecast error (3) (4) (5) (6) (7). Therefore, wind
power penetration into the market affects regulation requirements and reserve capacity
requirements that increase as wind penetration levels increase (3) (6) (7) (8) (9).
An extensive analysis of wind penetration in the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)
balancing area found that four hydroelectric power plants exhibited significant negative
correlation between ΔPower Output and ΔWind Generation (10). These were Chief Joseph,
Grand Coulee, John Day and The Dalles (10). A similar analysis was performed on the unit
level and units belonging to these four plants were the entirety of the top 40 correlated units in
BPA’s service area (10). The negative correlation suggests that as power from the wind farms
diminishes, these hydroelectric plants provide the additional power required by the grid and vice
versa (10). System operators cover this change in wind power output by ramping hydroelectric
units to increase or decrease power output.

Figure 1-1 Cumulative Distribution Functions of net load errors and load errors. Statistical model fit to data
from ERCOT (5).

3

This increase in unit starts became noticeable on a fleet-wide scale in 2012 as depicted in Figure
1-2. The trend continued in 2013 and 2014. Of concern to system operators is its correlation to
increased forced outage hours shown in Figure 1-3 where 2013-2014 have significant increases
compared to 2009-2012. The graphs display only the upper quartile of units as (10) found that
only a fraction of units ramping and start-stop cycling is affected.
Hydropower’s significant flexibility exacerbates the problem of determining the actual cost of an
outage. Due to hourly changes in the point price of electricity as seen in Figure 1-4 (11), flexible
plants can maximize profits by operating during high value periods. When plant flexibility is
lost due to one or more than one unit outages, the remaining units will operate in lower value
periods in order to prevent spill. Thus, while plant generation may not necessarily be affected by
the outage, plant revenue will decrease.
The length of the outage increases significantly when it is forced rather than planned since
design and transportation of the components does not typically happen before the outage occurs.
This increases the cost of forced outages as well (12). A forced outage resulting in a complete
overhaul of either the turbine or the generator system can last over three years while a planned
outage can be resolved in less than a year (12) .
The research questions posed in the problem statement aim to determine the significance of the
trends visualized in Figures 1-2 and 1-3 and how concerned stakeholders should be with the
changing dispatch patterns. The models developed provide a weighting technique that gives
more weight to unit failure data as more data points are collected. Weighting the unit failure data
verse expert component life estimates allows the estimation of parameter vectors, that when
combined with unit dispatch patterns provides a statistical risk of failure calculation.
Each component has technical, economic, and strategic lives that are weakly interconnected
making it difficult to distinguish between them in some instances. Ideally, the technical life of
component ݇ is described as the mean time to failure for the component. Realistically, utilities
estimate the technical life using expert opinion or manufacturer specifications which results in a
biased value that is typically an integer multiple of five. The strategic life will be defined as one
that incorporates the costs of planned and forced outages with the risk of failure to minimize
costs. The economic life is used in depreciation calculations and can equal either the technical or
strategic life or be a unique value based on the decrease in efficiency over time. The trend is to
focus too much on the technical life, since strategic and economic factors can vary significantly
over the hydropower fleet. This research aims to enable plant owners to make informed
decisions on strategic life based on how previous components have reached their technical life.
The two models we will use are a Strategic Life Model (SLM) and a Conditional Reliability
Model (CRM). The results of these models will be useful to plant and system managers and will
inform routine decisions. The CRM can take the form of either a single component, a group of
components within a selected unit or a group of units within a selected plant.
4
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Figure 1-3 NERC GADS Ranked Forced Outage Hours
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Figure 1-4 Hourly Fluctuations in the California ISO market (11)

The SLM discussed in section 4.3 quantifies the life reduction of the component k, under unique
dispatch scenarios s, to answer RQ1. To answer RQ2, the CRM will analyze multiple scenarios
as described in section 4.4 to show how altering future dispatch scenarios and parameter vectors
ߠ ሺ߰ሻ can affect component reliability. RQ3 will focus on three historical dispatch patterns and
determine a Reliability Index for each plant based on the optimal and least reliable distributions
detailed in section 4.5 using the same parameter vectors ߠ ሺ߰ሻ. Again, using the parameter
vectors ߠ ሺ߰ሻ, RQ4 will determine plant reliability values if historical hydrologic conditions
were repeated and is discussed in section 4.6.
The idea of a cost per unit start is often discussed in the hydroelectric industry (13) (14) (15)
since this average cost is incorporated into any power generation bid or ancillary service bid to
the market along with overhead, variable O&M, and fuel costs (14). The SLM supports long
term planning in determining the average cost of a unit start (15). By predicting the strategic life
of each component in RQ1, the system manager can accurately estimate the operational cost of
the unit. Surveys from (13) & (14) suggest MW rating correlates with unit start cost, but this is
influenced by the increased price of the replacement part and other increases to the outage cost
for larger plants (15) with estimates varying from $130 to $330 per start based on the nominal
rating of the unit with $330 value representing pumped storage plants (14). Alternatively, the
CRM enables asset managers to determine the marginal cost of a unit start for each operating
period (15). Hydropower is burdened with increased start stops over other fuel types because the
cost of a unit start for hydropower is significantly less than for steam turbine units allowing for
hydropower to supply specific ancillary services to the grid as discussed in section 2.1.2 (14).
6

System managers can use the results of the CRM to make dispatch decisions that optimize
component or system reliability as shown by answered RQ2 and RQ4. Utilities may deviate
from these optimal reliability dispatch patterns for a variety of reasons, particularly efficiency
and environmental requirements but these operations can be justified with the help of the RI to
show the extent of the suboptimality of the operations with respect to reliability by answering
RQ3. As other generating units on the grid undergo outages, system reliability becomes more
important as additional unit outages become more impactful to the grid.
Once outage cost information is acquired from TVA, this model can enable two additional use
cases. Future Use Case 1 enables plant managers to alter dispatch patterns to minimize the riskcost of failures for the system. This requires weighting the reliability of each component by the
expected outage cost. Future Use Case 2 determines component replacement priority given
budgetary constraints where risk-cost reduction is analyzed for unique scenarios where funds are
allocated to different budgetary line items for component replacement in the off-peak season.
Similarly, entire units can be compared against each other to determine priority for overhaul
work similar to TVA’s Hydropower Modernization Program or New York Power Authority’s
Life Extension and Modernization Program.

7

2. Background
This review illustrates the complexity of the problem including the complexity of the system of
components, how the hydroelectric industry is currently addressing the problem, and how other
industries have worked to solve similar problems. Hydroelectric system operations, the design
and behavior of hydroelectric powertrain components, and statistical methods used in reliability
analyses are described in sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. Optimization methodologies, physics based
models and data accessibility are reviewed in sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6. Maintenance practices,
failure analyses and damage/lifetime analyses used in the hydroelectric industry are discussed in
sections 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9.

2.1. Hydropower System, Facility and Unit Operations
Each hydroelectric facility is unique but there are efforts to identify peer groups within the fleet.
Typically, these efforts use unit capacity (MW rating) and/or mode of operation. The ancillary
services market provides another dividing line as specific plants routinely provide specific
services to the grid. The ancillary services the plant provides to the grid, the plant's MOP and
plant owner decisions all affect the plant dispatch pattern. These dispatch patterns have changed
over time with start-stops becoming more frequent and decreasing ramp times which causes
increased ramp rates. These two aspects of modern hydroelectric units mutually enhance the
cyclic wear mechanisms (15). This section details the different modes of operation, ancillary
services and maintenance strategies that define hydroelectric plants operations and maintenance.
System operations describes the management tools necessary to extract the full potential value
from a river system simplified below as four facilities with a total of 14 units. Whether they are
owned by one utility or multiple entities system operational planning will benefit all facilities
involved. Facility operational planning involves unit commitment decisions that are subject to a
variety of forces including power efficiency, water quality, fish passage, and risk-reliability.
Annual unit operations, hereafter termed dispatch patterns, refers to the annual generating hours
and annual unit start-stop cycles each unit is allocated. Other unit operation categories will be
discussed in section 2.1.3.

U1
U2
F4 U3
U4
U5

F3

F2 = NOH

U1 U2 U3

U1 U2

U1
U2
F1 = CHH
U3
U4

Figure 2-1 Diagram of Hydropower System. Multiple interconnected facilities with a varied number of units
at each facility.
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2.1.1. Modes of Operation
Hydroelectric facilities are routinely classified as either run-of-river or peaking. In the very early
stages of U.S. hydropower, it was not uncommon for run of river plants to start in the autumn
and run continuously to the spring (15). The ramp time to full load has also decreased
significantly from historical use. It is believed that quick start up times combined with more
frequent start-stops both factor into increased component degradation.
As electric grids became more complex, hydroelectric plants that are capable of providing
peaking power were increasingly asked to do so. As riverine sojourn time has become more
understood and communication between plants on the same river has increased, optimizing the
operation schedule has become a priority. This is limited by a plant’s MOP. MOPs effectively
group hydroelectric facilities as seen in Table 2-1 (16). Reservoir size, residence time and dam
height are significant in determining the plant's MOP (16). In addition to run-of river and
peaking designations, 4 additional MOP’s are used: run-of-river with upstream peaking,
intermediate peaking, peaking with seasonal run-of-river, and reregulating plants. Run-of-river
plants do not have much temporal flexibility in when they produce power. Therefore, when
additional flexibility is required by the grid, the dispatch patterns of peaking and intermediate
peaking plants will be increasingly affected.

Table 2-1 Dam Modes of Operation (16)

MOP
Run-of-river

Description
Discharges from the tailrace or dam approximate the sum of inflows to the
reservoir at any given time. Hydroelectric generation is dependent upon
natural incoming flows. Minimal fluctuation of the reservoir surface elevation
Peaking
Stores and releases water (high flow releases) for hydroelectric generation.
Typically, large reservoir fluctuations because of seasonal drawdowns
Run-ofOperates as a run-of-river facility but harnesses inflows from upstream storage
river/upstream releases or peaking operations to generate electricity.
Peaking
Intermediate
Stores limited amounts of water for occasional releases or moderates the
peaking
intensity of peaking for hydroelectric generation.
Run-ofOperates as run-of-river for periods of time or seasons (e.g. during fish
river/peaking spawning) and then operates as a peaking facility the remainder of the time.
Reregulating
Stores and releases water to stabilize flow fluctuations from upstream peaking
or storage release facilities and generates electricity. Mitigation facility.

2.1.2. Ancillary Services
Power generation is the primary service, but hydroelectric units’ fast ramp times allow the
contribution of ancillary services to the grid. Hydroelectric units can provide online regulation
through AGC, meet reserve power requirements, and provide voltage control through
9

synchronous condensing operation. The MW rating of the largest unit on the local grid is
typically the minimum amount of reserve capacity required by the system operator.
Online regulation causes increased reliance on AGC in hydropower. Hydroelectric units
transitioning from set point dispatch to AGC dispatch may see an increase in unit starts of one to
two orders of magnitude (3). Regulation, in the form of AGC causes runner wear and wicket
gate wear and tear (13).
Spinning reserve is called into service when there is an under commitment of generation possibly
due to a severe over forecast of wind resources (17). If there is an over-commitment of
generation due to excess wind power generation, wind power can be curtailed or other resources
can be reduced or shut off to maintain system balance (17). Spinning reserve operation of
hydroelectric units causes runner wear, generator wear and circuit breaker wear (13).
The differences between supplemental reserve and replacement reserve are the start-up time of
the generators and the expected operating time (17). Due to its quick start-up time, hydropower
typically acts as supplemental reserve. Supplemental reserve operation causes an increase in
generator wear and circuit breaker wear (13).
Synchronous condensing operation enables the hydroelectric unit to provide VAR (volt-ampere
reactive) and inertial support to the grid without passing water through the turbine. This reactive
power is essential for transmission and distribution of AC power. System inertia helps the grid
minimize frequency deviations from 60 Hz.
2.1.3. Dispatch States
The generation mix of the balancing area and the interconnection abilities of the local grid both
affect the dispatch patterns of hydroelectric units. The International Energy Agency classified
hydroelectric dispatch states into five categories (4). Three of these categories roughly
correspond to the ancillary services discussed in the previous section.
x
x
x

x
x

Automatic Generation Control (AGC): The power output of the unit(s) is automatically
adjusted to maintain the desired grid frequency.
Set Point: Online and running at a set power output chosen by the system operator.
Condensing: The unit runs to provide volt-ampere reactive support without passing water.
Instead, air is injected and the generator stator runs as a motor allowing the unit to be
synchronous to the grid. This decreases the energy losses in the power system and improves
the quality of electric power.
Standby: Not generating but can be brought online in 5 minutes and up to full power within
10 minutes.
Unavailable due to Outage: Unit or plant maintenance is occurring.

When quantifying the degradation and failure rates of components, set point dispatch is the
assumed dispatch state. With the right data AGC and synchronous condensing operation can be
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analyzed to determine the role these dispatch states play in component reliability. “Unavailable
due to outage” has various sub-states defined as forced, planned and maintenance outages. Not
all outage events affect the value of the hydroelectric project equally. The number of units at the
plant, number of other units at the plant experiencing outages, intensity-duration-frequency of
precipitation events in the watershed, time of year, type of outage, action required, cost of
components and repair time all affect the total cost of the outage.

2.2. Hydroelectric Powertrain Components
The hydroelectric powertrain includes the turbine, governor, generator, exciter, transformer and
circuit breaker and their associated subcomponents. The arrangement of each component and the
failure modes and mechanisms for components of interest will be discussed herein.
Additionally, actions taken by industry to monitor or reduce the degradation of components will
be included. This project will focus only on the current installed levels of technology for each
component. As technological advances occur, each component must be analyzed again.
Previous research into failure mechanisms of hydroelectric powertrain components was
summarized by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in (13). Increased operation,
ramping, start-stop cycling and/or thermal cycling are noted failure mechanisms for various
components including the wicket gates, turbine runner, governor, generator stator bars, stator
windings, rotor windings, thrust bearings and main shut off valve. The cost burden of unit start
impact is not evenly distributed between components as recent projections suggests the generator
stator windings, rotor, thrust bearings, auxiliary equipment and the main shut off valve account
for at least 75% of start-stop costs (15). The turbine and governor account for 15-20% of startstop costs while the excitation system, cooling water system, main transformer and the load
breaker have a minor role in start-stop costs (15).
Exciters and governors are critical powertrain components but their low failure rates and low
costs of outages compared to turbines and generators discourages discussion of their failure
modes at this time. The excitation system ensures that the unit voltage is synchronized to the
grid voltage before power generation occurs (18). An excitation system incorporates an exciter,
regulator, terminal voltage transducer and load compensator, and a power system stabilizer (18).
Exciter technology has evolved from direct current exciters to alternating current exciters to
static systems (18). The excitation system controls the voltage of the output electric energy and
the VARs provided to the grid (18). The regulator processes and amplifies the control signal for
the exciter (18). The transducer converts the terminal voltage into a DC quantity to compare
with a reference voltage and the load compensator may be used to keep the voltage at a set point
(18). The system stabilizer acts to dampen the input signal to prevent the unit from hunting for
the perfect operating point (18).
Governors control the speed and power of the unit by signaling the wicket gate servomotor to
adjust the wicket gate opening (18). In adjustable Kaplan turbines, the runner blade servomotor
also receives a signal and adjusts the blade angle (18). Droop is required to prevent the unit from
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“hunting” the optimal point. Mechanical governors are highly reliable machines but minimal
maintenance staff experience and obsolescence of spare parts can sometimes be deciding factors
for replacement (18). Digital governors have a much shorter lifespan as the programmable logic
controller and the software, whether proprietary or industrial, becomes obsolete quicker (18).
The lower cost of the digital governor however makes it the default choice for new hydroelectric
installations (18).
2.2.1. Hydroelectric Turbines
There are three main hydroelectric turbine designs for medium and large capacity units, Kaplan,
Francis and Pelton. Kaplan and Francis turbines are both reaction turbines while the Pelton is an
impulse turbine (18). Specific speed of the turbine and hydraulic head are two criteria used to
determine which type of turbine is best suited for the site (19). Selection criteria is shown in
Figure 2-2. Due to these variables Pelton turbines represent a minority of the U.S. fleet and were
excluded from the Corps expert elicitation and will not be discussed further.

Figure 2-2 Turbine type selection

Turbines Types and Associated Components
Kaplan turbine runners are versatile as the newest designs allow for the blade angle to be
adjusted (18). Four to seven adjustable blades operate in conjunction with the wicket gates to
allow a wider range of efficient operation under varying flow rates (20). Vertically oriented
units are the industry norm since horizontal units require a larger footprint (20). Francis turbines
2.2.1.1.
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are used for medium and high head projects. The turbine can be oriented vertically or
horizontally based on powerhouse design (18). Both Kaplan and Francis units have similar
subcomponents that must be discussed. At a minimum, this includes the scroll case, stay vanes,
wicket gate assembly and shear pins, turbine runner, turbine shaft, shaft packing, and turbine
guide bearings, (18).
The scroll case distributes the water from the penstock to the stay vanes at near uniform velocity
(18). The stay vanes guide the flow of water towards the wicket gates (18). The scroll case, stay
vanes and wicket gates are designed to minimize head loss. The wicket gates can be adjusted
during operation to alter the flow rate or closed to stop flow (18). When open, the wicket gates
align very closely to the static stay vanes to reduce cross flow (18). The wicket gate shear pins
are designed as a sacrificial part to prevent linkage failures due to overstressing during gate
closing (18). The wicket gate assembly provides the structural support for the wicket gate blades
while the wicket gate stem rotates within the wicket gate bushing (18). The flow then passes
through the turbine runner to generate mechanical energy. The turbine runner is designed for
efficiency, fish passage, and cavitation resistance. The turbine shaft transfers the torque from the
turbine runner to the generator shaft and then to the generator rotor (18). The shaft packing
minimizes water leaking along the shaft surface. The turbine guide bearings keep the turbine and
turbine shaft centered by resisting the hydraulic side loads that occur during operation (18).
Turbine Failure Modes
Hydroelectric turbines in particular are a critical part of the powertrain, but economic end of life
factors, such as efficiency upgrades and fish passage are influential in replacement decisions thus
complicating the process of interpreting failure data from outage data. Each type of turbine, has
its own failure modes and reliability curve.
2.2.1.2.

Cavitation damage to the turbine runner has been critical to detect due to its effect on unit
efficiency and component life (18). Cavitation monitoring systems are now included during
most turbine replacements (18). The plant owner can then learn to avoid the cavitation zones in
the operating curve (18).
Fatigue crack growth is another prevalent failure mode for hydroelectric turbines. Studies show
that ramp events and partial load dispatch are more important than start-stop cycling in
estimating turbine degradation where fatigue crack growth is a concern (13) (21). A
deterministic answer can be found using structural stress analysis and Miner’s cumulative
damaged theory (21) (22). A recent EPRI sponsored paper declares likely consequences of unit
cycling to include the reduction of the fatigue life of the turbine runner, shaft, and wicket gates
and increased wear of thrust and guide bearings and wicket gate bushings (23).
Francis turbine runners constantly encounter unsteady service loads due to the high-frequency
pressure fluctuations caused by irregular fluid flow around the guide vanes. These number of
small amplitude stress cycles is equal to the number of guide vanes multiplied by the rotational
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speed of the turbine (1/min) multiplied by the number of operating minutes for the unit (24).
This leads to a large quantity of small amplitude stress cycles which we must then compare to a
small quantity of large amplitude stress cycles caused by start-stops (24). The additional stress
of overload operation does not reach the amplitude of start-stop stresses and thus has only a
minor role in expected lifetime (24).
The typical hydroelectric unit has roughly 20 wicket gates. These gates control the flow of water
into the turbine. Wicket gate shear pins are designed as sacrificial parts that break due to
mechanical overload on the wicket gate in order prevent damage to costlier components.
Increased start-stop events and high ramping rates induce greater fluid and vibrational forces
onto the wicket gates, the bushings, and other wicket gate assembly components (23). This
causes increased leakage when gates are closed and increased shear pin failures. Shear pins are
easily replaced, but if the root cause of the shear pin failure is not addressed, more costly failures
may occur.
Complicating this process, there is now increased evidence that fatigue crack propagation may
contribute to shear pin failure of older shear pins. Structural stress analyses using ANSYS has
produced results for an S-N curve (Stress vs Number of cycles) for AISI 410 shear pins (25).
Since this analysis produced significant results showing that bending fatigue is a concern in shear
pins, it furthers the need for tracking operations data and lifetime analysis (25). Data analysis of
wicket gate movement would provide the necessary values to estimate the occurrence of failure.
One start-stop cycle includes opening and closing the wicket gate, but unit ramping can increase
wicket gate movement during one start-stop cycle. These failures must be treated independently
of shear pin failures not caused by fatigue and are not a primary concern in this research.
2.2.2. Hydroelectric Generators
The generator converts the mechanical energy of the turbine into electrical energy to be
distributed by the grid. The two main components are the stator and the rotor. As their names
suggest, the stator is stationary and the rotor rotates. The cooling system, thrust bearings and
generator shaft are other subcomponents that are critical to reliable operation (18).
Generator and Associated Components
The generator is composed of multiple components that convert the rotational energy of the shaft
into electrical energy, chiefly the stator and rotor. The generator stator consists of the stator
frame, stator windings and the stator core. The stator frame is designed “for high torsional,
buckling and vibration stiffness” (26). The stator windings are the electrically insulated copper
conductors that are systematically connected to satisfy the design voltage and power
requirements (18). The stator winding insulation is a critical subcomponent for reliability
analyses due to how suboptimal conditions can greatly affect the degradation of the insulation
and the delicate balance designers must consider between increased power output and increased
reliability due to the size constraints of the copper wiring and insulation (18). The stator core is
comprised of thin laminations of steel that each has a thin coating of insulating varnish (18).
2.2.2.1.
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This provides the magnetic circuit path while minimizing eddy current losses and provides the
strength necessary to support the stator windings (18). The size of the copper wiring and the
volume of insulation is designed to maximize power output while minimize copper losses and
withstanding thermal stresses.
The generator rotor must carry the operational loads without producing significant vibration (18).
The rotor spider is the structural component that connects to the generator shaft and has the
electrical field poles affixed to the perimeter (18). The field poles are connected in series and
each copper winding is insulated, establishing the electrical circuit, which upon excitation
provides rotor flux to the air gap (18).
Hydroelectric generators typically use direct cooling systems that utilize raw cooling water to
reduce thermal stresses. Older, smaller units may have indirect cooling systems installed where
air is passed over the components by a fan (18). If continuous monitoring of the stator winding
temperature shows an increased operating temperature for normal load and ambient conditions, a
maintenance outage is justified to investigate the issue (18). Cleaning the generator of dirt and
debris can decrease the operational temperature 5°C (18) leading to smaller thermal stresses on
components.
The thrust bearings can be located on either the top side or bottom side of the rotor (18). The
thrust bearing carries the downward dynamic operating load of the water and the static load of
the rotor (18). An oil film is produced between the rotating collar and the stationary shoes of
tolerable thickness and pressure to prevent contact (18). The generator shaft is bolted to the
turbine shaft. Proper alignment provided by a second set of guide bearings is necessary to
achieve the proper air gap between the rotor and stator and proper bearing loading (18).
Generator Failure Modes
The main components at risk of failure in the generator are the rotor and the stator and their
associated windings, bushings terminals and the stator bars. A survey on generator failures from
1199 hydroelectric generators in Australia, Germany, Norway, Spain, and Sweden concentrated
on failures that took 10+ days to repair on units rated greater than 10 MVA in the last ten years
(27). Of the 76 failures that met the criteria, 43 of them were caused by insulation damage
(56.6%) while mechanical damage accounted for eighteen failures (23.7%), thermal damage for
thirteen (17.1%), and bearing damage for two (2.6%) (27).
2.2.2.2.

The study detailed damage categories and root causes of failure. Feedback was provided on
what could have prevented the failure from occurring and this is important to have in order to
correct the problems at hand. Examples of this included improved detection and alarm systems,
increased design requirements, and improved quality control during design, manufacture and
assembly (27). This study did not detail the specific subcomponent that endured a failure. This
section will summarize knowledge on subcomponent specific failure modes and mechanisms
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Dispatch state, component design, and experienced operating incidents all affect the component
life of the generator rotor. Frequent start-stops induce mechanical wear on the copper winding
insulation reduces the lifetime to 30% to 50% of a similar base load plant (28). Units that
operate in synchronous generation mode experience similar degradation rates. If these dispatch
states are expected, special design cases, such as body mounted retaining rings and direct
conductor cooling, can regain lost life expectancy (28). Contamination of insulating materials
with carbon, silicone or oil can lead to premature failure due to overheating and shorted turns
(28). Otherwise, the buckling of the laminations is the most critical factor as this can lead to
short circuits and/or damage to the stator bars (15).
Shorted turns and field grounds can occur with damaged insulation (18). A short occurs when
the copper turns are no longer insulated properly and thus make contact with each other (18).
Although shorts are not desirable, a generator can continue to function with a limited number of
shorts and repair is only necessary if unit rating cannot be achieved or undesirable levels of
thermal sensitivity of the field (28). Field grounds occur when the ground-wall insulation breaks
down. This requires immediate removal from service as the occurrence of a second field ground
would result in catastrophic damage of the rotor forging, wedges and/or retaining ring (28).
Stator windings are classified based on the voltage rating and the type of insulation. Asphaltic
Mica insulation has shown thermal cycling deterioration, but some industry experts believe that
newer thermoset insulation does not experience this cyclic deterioration (29). Multiple
stakeholders do still find cyclic deterioration to be a culprit in stator winding failures (13) (30)
(31) and have estimated cyclic wear coefficients which will be discussed in 3.6.4. Dissenters
suggest that adequate knowledge of the thermal age of the unit is not available when the
maintenance staff is determining “the difference between delamination and weakly bounded
layers of insulation” (29).
A report on thermoset stator windings shows 46% of the symptoms reported involved loose coils
and/or loose winding materials (32). Proper installation of wedge and side packing minimizes
coil vibration. The thermal expansion of older asphaltic mica insulation systems meant less
packing was necessary with the previous technology level (32). They concluded that windings
with a MVA rating less than 100 or with a stator core height less than 70” are less prone to loose
coils and winding materials that, if left untreated, could result in severe mechanical and electrical
degradation (32). To fix loose materials the generator is taken off-line and possibly
disassembled. Visual inspection can then determine what subcomponent to repair, replace or
refurbish. These problems are caused by the “large and frequent temperature variations
occurring due to ‘cold start’” and the differing coefficients of thermal expansion of the two
materials. Efficient standstill heating and effective cooling water systems can help reduce the
thermal gradients experienced during operation (15).
Thermal cycling is a failure mechanism that traditionally makes increased start-stops concerning.
Thermal cycling causes mechanical deformation of the insulation at the slot exits (15). It is
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believed that the insulation material and manufacturer of the stator bars contribute significantly
to the degradation caused by start-stop cycling. However, breakdowns occurred in both
thermoplastic and micadur® insulation during the voltage endurance tests performed (15). It is
difficult to distinguish between a reduced lifetime caused by defects in the insulation and a
reduced lifetime caused by thermal cycling, but the test performed resulted in bars with reduced
lifetimes (15).
Hydroelectric power stations are one of the most heavy-duty applications for thrust bearings, as
the bearings must carry both the weight of the turbine and generator as well as the hydraulic
down thrust of the turbine. The limiting factor on white metal bearing alloys is fatigue strength,
but temperature plays a key role in the strength of the bearing. Bearings, if properly taken care
of can have a long component life and most failures are due to issues with the cooling system or
the oil system (33). An increased temperature affects the viscosity of the oil and the fatigue
strength of the bearings. Maintaining a reasonable oil film thickness is also critical in order to
avoid metal on metal interaction (33). Misalignment of the bearing pads can cause uneven wear
and thus premature replacement (33). ABB, a Swiss company, field-tested an on-line monitoring
system that measures the oil film thickness, pressure and temperature distributions for hydrogenerator thrust bearings in 1997 (34). By monitoring these three variables and taking corrective
actions, which may include turning off the unit to allow the oil to cool, an owner can
significantly reduce catastrophic bearing failure (34).
2.2.3. GSU Transformer
The Generator Step-Up Unit (GSU) transformers are used to increase the voltage so that
transmission losses are minimized while distributing the energy to the different load centers (18).
They are located in close proximity to the generating unit.
Transformer Technology
The insulation, windings, bushings and cooling system consists of similar features as presented
in previous sections (18). The transformer core consists of magnetic laminations stacked
together (18). Each lamination has a thin layer of insulation to protect the lamination from the
adjacent laminations (18). Based on design capacity and other criteria the core can be either
single phase or three phase (18).
2.2.3.1.

Insulted wires wound around the core act as the conducting circuit (18). The primary and
secondary windings interact to increase the voltage (18). The turn ratio is the ratio between the
number of turns on the primary windings and the number of turns on the secondary winding and
is equal to the ratio of the voltages on the two lines (18). The increased voltage of the output
current decreases line losses.
The bushing in an electrical device consists of a conductor surrounded by insulation to prevent
the electrical energy from discharging to a grounded material. The bushing connects the internal
windings to the external line connections (18). There are multiple types of insulation materials
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available and the insulation includes both a solid insulator and a liquid insulator (18). Solid
insulation materials include electrical grade cellulose, wood and insulating varnishes (18).
Liquid insulation such as highly processed mineral oil can also be used as a cooling medium for
the transformer (18). An external cooling system removes waste heat efficiently to keep the
components within design operating temperatures (18). The heat exchanger provides surface
area for the insulating fluid to transfer the waste heat to the external system (18). The external
system can be either water-cooled or air cooled.
Transformer Failure Modes
Transformer failures primarily concern three different failure mechanisms: thermal related faults,
dielectric related faults and mechanical related faults. Thermal failures occur when the oil or
winding temperatures increase and produce localized hot spots. These localized hot spots have
deteriorating effects on the insulation due to the different coefficient of thermal expansion.
Factors affecting end of life are unit-loading, temperature and the number of short circuits/overvoltages experienced (35).
2.2.3.2.

Partial discharge is a dielectric failure mechanism of the insulation system where voids form
thereby deteriorating the insulation system. In order to locate and characterize the type of partial
discharge that occurred, a measuring system such as Phase Resolved Partial Discharge Analysis
is used. Partial discharges appear as evenly spaced bursts on an oscilloscope whereas arcing has
a random pattern (35).
Mechanical failure mechanisms include short circuit forces and vibrations of the core and
winding structures. This can lead to deformation of the windings, cleats or leads. Deformations
can be detected using leakage inductance because short circuit events decrease the inner
winding’s diameter and increase the outer winding’s diameter giving a higher leakage flux (35).
2.2.4. Generator Output Circuit Breakers
The circuit breakers prevent damage from overcurrent and short circuits. In hydropower plant
design, there are two major circuit breakers, the generator output breaker and the grid breaker.
This research focuses on the generator output breaker.
Circuit Breaker Technology
The generator output breaker is located between the generator and the GSU transformer (18).
The circuit breakers break the circuit when the current exceeds the allowable level in order to
prevent damaging overheating of the circuit (18). Types of circuit breakers are differentiated
based on the medium used to extinguish the arc. Before 1970, air and oil circuit breakers were
the industry standard. Development of vacuum breakers and SF6 (sulfur hexafluoride) breakers
offered alternatives that increased safety and simplified design (18). For worker safety, the
circuit breaker is opened during outages to prevent accidental excitation of electrical equipment.
2.2.4.1.
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Circuit Breakers Failure Modes
If a circuit breaker fails to open, larger electrical failures will likely ensue. The best predictor of
outage rate for circuit breakers is system voltage and it is known that “failure frequency
increases with system voltage” (36). EPRI estimates the SF6 type circuit breakers replacement
period as 7 years based on an estimation of five closures per year. It is suggested by (18) to not
leave the circuit breaker in one state for more than two months at a time.
2.2.4.2.

2.3. Reliability Statistics
Reliability describes the probability that the component will remain failure free for a given time
period. Conversely, the probability of failure is the chance that the unit will fail in a given time
period. The reliability function of choice is the Weibull Distribution which will be introduced
and its parameter estimation techniques discussed.
2.3.1. Weibull Distribution
The Weibull distribution models the independent random variable t, which in cases of reliability
is commonly referred to as the time to failure. The Two Parameter Weibull Distribution utilizes
the shape parameter β, which governs the kurtosis, standard deviation and variance of the model,
and the scale parameter α, also called the characteristic life (37). When β = 1 the Weibull
distribution reduces to the exponential distribution and when β = 2, it reduces to the Rayleigh
distribution. These are special cases and show that the Weibull distribution is a more flexible
alternative. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the Two-Parameter Weibull is:
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By setting t = α in equation 2-2, α describes the time it takes for 63.2% of the population to fail:
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The reliability function determines the percent of the population that survives to time t:
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The shape parameter β has three unique conditions, 0<β<1, β=1 and β>1. If 0<β<1 then the
failure rate is decreasing, which is typical of wear in failure and is called “infant mortality”. If
β=1 then the failure rate is constant. Finally, a β>1 means an increasing failure rate and the
component has reached the “wear out” stage of its life. It is expected for all components to have
β>1. Example CDF and probability density function (pdf) curves with various ߚ values are
depicted in Figure 2-3 and 2-4. All three distributions have the same ߙ value as changing ߙ only
stretches or narrows the distribution. The pdf of the Two-Parameter Weibull Distribution is:
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Conditional reliability defines the reliability of the component given that the component survived
to a certain age, T. The probability of A, given that B occurs is expressed as P(A|B). Therefore,
the reliability function to replace P(B) as this defines the probability that the unit has survived
until time T and the reliability function to replace P(A) signifies the probability that the failure
will occur by time T+t.
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The Weibull distribution was chosen over other lifetime distribution models, notably the Gamma
Distribution and the Exponential Distribution. The Gamma Distribution represents the sum of n
exponentially distributed random variables. Similar to the Weibull, it can represent increasing or
decreasing failure rates. The Exponential Distribution is a special case of the Gamma
Distribution when only one partial failure results in an actual failure. Similarly, the Exponential
Distribution is a special case of the Weibull Distribution for when ߚ ൌ ͳ. The Gamma
Distribution is best utilized in systems where multiple partial failures result in an actual failure.
Since this is not the case in hydroelectric powertrain equipment we choose the Weibull
Distribution. Determination of Weibull Parameters
To estimate the true distribution parameters that govern the failure rate of each component we
collect failure data and expert opinions. The choice to use Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) was made since it can easily combine multiple data sources (38). This method estimates
the true distribution parameters by calculating the likelihood that given parameter vector ߠ, we
would obtain each individual failure point ݔଵ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݔఠ and suspension point ݖଵ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݖఓ . This
introduces the likelihood function ܮሺߠሻ which is equal to the product of the pdf value for failure
point multiplied by the product of the CDF value for each suspended point (39). By maximizing
the likelihood function, we find the parameter vector that maximizes the probability that all of
the collected information exists within the same distribution.
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Survival or censored data points occur when the component is removed from service before
failure occurs. MLE can be performed individually on both the expert opinion data and the unit
failure data, but the final parameter estimation will maximize the product of the two likelihood
functions as shown in equation 2-9 (39).
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 ܮሺߠǢ ܱܨܰܫሻ ൌ  ܮሺߠǢ ܲܺܧƬܣܶܣܦሻ ൌ ൫ܮሺߠǢ ܲܺܧሻ ܮ כሺߠǢ ܣܶܣܦሻ൯ [ 2-9 ]
Negative log likelihood is used in optimization models because it changes the equation from a
product of likelihoods to a summation of log likelihoods. This enables faster calculation of
partial derivatives providing a quicker optimization. Additionally, the majority of optimization
routines are designed to minimize, so we choose to minimize the negative log likelihood, rather
than maximizing the log likelihood as these are equivalent arguments.
[ 2-10 ]
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Although other techniques can be used to convert these expert estimated values into a Weibull
distribution, there is no literature available on combining expert values with actual failure data
using rank regression on y (RRY) or rank regression on x (RRX) and therefore probability
plotting techniques are insignificant. To check the accuracy of MLE though we can compare the
resultant parameter vector from the expert elicited values obtained using MLE to rank regression
methods by calculating the Mean Squared Error (MSE) to validate that our MLE results in a
smaller or similar MSE (38). Methodologies for Weibull RRY and RRX can be found in (38).
For linear systems, the MSE will produce the same results as RRY, but since the Weibull
distribution is non-linear RRY does not always minimize the MSE. The MSE equation is:
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Where ݕఊ and ܨ൫ݕఊ ൯ denote the time and CDF estimates that are given in the expert elicitation.

2.4. Generalized Reduced Gradient Optimization
Microsoft Excel provides a solver add-in tool for use in solving complex linear and nonlinear
functions. The tool provides three different optimization schemes, Simplex LP for linear
functions, GRG non-linear for non-linear smooth functions, and evolutionary for non-linear, nonsmooth functions. Both our MLE calculations and Dispatch Decision Scheme are non-linear
smooth functions and can be solved using GRG non-linear.
GRG nonlinear uses an iterative process to solve smooth non-linear equations. This method
requires a feasible starting point, that the analyst provides. Using partial derivatives, the
algorithm selects the variable with the steepest descent direction and selects a step size based on
imposed constraints (40). The trial step size is continuously halved until certain descent
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conditions are satisfied. The function is then solved to ensure ݃ሺݔାଵ ሻ ൏ ݃ሺݔ ሻ and finds the
value of this variable that corresponds with the local minimum (40). The process is repeated
until it converges to a solution. When a constrained variable encounters one of its bounds,
movement in that direction is removed from consideration by the algorithm (40).
To ensure a globally maximum solution we use the multi-start capability of Excel’s Solver.
Using a population size of 1,000, solver uses 1,000 randomly selected initial conditions and
determines the global maximum by optimizing each of the 1,000 trials. Other solver options
were changed to accommodate specifications of our desired solution. Precision (ͳǤͲ ൈ ͳͲିଽ ) and
convergence (ͳǤͲ ൈ ͳͲି ) values govern how the solver perceives a local maximum as the
change in the target cell in the last five iterations is compared to the convergence setting and the
precision setting indicates the sensitivity of the decision variables. Setting “derivatives = 2”,
uses central differencing for estimates of partial derivatives and was used since it is a more
robust method. Setting “Assume nonneg = TRUE” will keep the decision variables positive.
Although there are other constraints on each decision variables, it may be seen as repetitive, but
is used regardless. Use of “Automatic Scaling = TRUE” allows solver to rescale the variables to
a similar magnitude as the constraints.

2.5. Physics Based vs Statistical Approaches
Physics based approaches to failure mechanisms for turbine runners (22) (23) (24), wicket gate
shear pins (25), and stator windings (29) are used throughout the industry as highlighted in 2.1.
These include computational modelling and advanced life testing which can both conclude a
mean time to failure but are resource intensive. To infer probabilistic reliability from advanced
life testing is inconvenient due to cost limitations on sample size. The solution to this sample
size issue is to collect actual failure data. This introduces the concern of data quality as data
collection is dispersed amongst interested parties.
Our models currently use the Weibull distribution for reliability decisions but to more accurately
model each component we must model each relevant failure mechanism that the component
experiences using combined life curves (41) that take the same shape as the poly-Weibull
distribution. That is, a systems Weibull distribution for three unique components are combined
into one reliability equation in the same fashion that three failure mechanisms for one component
can be combined into one reliability equation for that component.
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If data quality is low and does not include accurate designations of the dominant failure
mechanism, statistical methods to estimate the parameters of combined life curves detailed in
(42) can be used to compute these distributions. It is expected that the methodology used to
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describe the expert elicited values will have to be altered to use these statistical methods once
failure mechanism data is obtained.
If physics based approaches provide a cyclic wear coefficient it can be input into the parameter
vector and removed from the MLE and the SLM and CRM will both still operate as designed. A
key issue in hydropower currently is the disagreement over these cyclic wear coefficients. A
statistical approach provides another source of information for asset managers to consider.

2.6. Sources of Reliability Data
Historically the hydroelectric industry has been data poor. Recent efforts have resulted in
utilities increasing their data acquisition and storage capabilities. There is still not a consensus
on the time interval used for operational data. TVA has decreased this timestep from 6 hours in
the 1970’s and 1980’s to 5 minutes as of 2004. Additionally, interagency communication is
increasing but data sharing is still facilitated through the FERC prescribed mandatory reporting
to NERC. Industry groups, including CEATI and EPRI have allowed formalized group settings
to discuss industry challenges and how best to face them. Operations and Maintenance “Best
Practices” have been disseminated by ORNL (18). While CEATI, EPRI and ORNL are well
suited to lead research initiatives, data collection still falls squarely on the shoulders of utilities.
Unit O&M data can be difficult to obtain from utilities because a competitive marketplace
produces a “keep it to ourselves” approach (13). Some utilities have developed partnerships to
work cooperatively on mutually beneficial analyses. We will discuss the Hydropower Asset
Management Partnership (HydroAMP) between Corps, United States Bureau of Reclamation
(USBR), Hydro Quebec and Bonneville Power Administration. Data reported to NERC that is
available for purchase will also be discussed in this section. In order to make informed decisions
while lacking significant unit failure data points, utilities use expert elicitations. The results of
the elicitations can be used to validate component life estimates and provide confidence in
economic values derived from these component life estimates.
2.6.1. Expert Elicitations
The Corps expert elicitation followed a Delphi method where five to seven experts with
“disparate domain knowledge” provide estimates, receive feedback, discuss and provide a
second round of estimates (43) (44). The Corps elicitation was not a pure Delphi technique
because all of the experts were directly engaged with each other and were moderately acquainted
with one another. This was done to speed along the process and increase participation compared
to electronic questionnaires while acquaintances were inevitable based on the finite number of
qualified experts accessible to the Corps.
Delphi Technique
The Delphi technique is one method of collecting expert opinions. First developed by RAND
Corporation it is now used in various disciplines to aid decision makers. In its purist form, the
Delphi technique will “obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of experts… by a
2.6.1.1.
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series of intensive questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback (45). This
method is not intended to compete with historical data, but is often used when this data is lacking
or impractical. There is no consensus that the number of experts used impacts the accuracy of
the method, but it inherently uses three experts at minimum. Reference (44) suggests that equal
weighting of experts provides a more accurate result than weighting the experts unequally
regardless of how weights are distributed. Reference (39) uses a single expert opinion to weigh
against historical data, but with access to multiple experts, using a single expert’s opinion instead
of the median of the expert estimates would theoretically be less accurate.
The Delphi technique instructs the user to elicit information from all experts and to provide
feedback to the experts, in our case, by displaying the individual’s estimates. Then the experts
whose estimates fall outside of the upper and lower quartiles are asked to “give reasons why they
believe their selections are correct against the majority opinion”. After discussion was
concluded, the experts are given the opportunity to change their estimates. This can continue for
any number of rounds, but there is no evidence of accuracy improving, so the Corps stopped the
process after two rounds.
Corps Expert Elicitation
The experts met at Corps offices in Portland, OR for three days with experts joining and
departing as their expertise was needed. Starting with generator components moving to electrical
components and finally turbines and governors the group of experts went through this Delphi
method, estimating five points on the CDF curve for each component.
2.6.1.2.

Routine maintenance, broadly described as maintenance that does not improve the current
condition of the component, is assumed to occur for all units during failure curve modelling as
exemplified by some of the listed assumptions (46). Routine inspection, greasing, cleaning,
calibration etc. may reduce the degradation rate and failure to perform these tasks as prescribed
may lead to premature failure but performing them does not improve the current condition of the
component (46). Major maintenance tasks are assumed to improve the technical state of the
component by rehabilitation or repair to “as good as new” condition. Detailed information on
maintenance best practices for specific equipment can be found in (18) & (47).
In order to convert this data into a parameter estimation, we must use this information to estimate
the probability of failure from ሺͲǡ ܶ ሿ. More importantly, as discussed in section 2.9.4 there are
methods that combine this data with failure data to achieve a combined solution. These curves
will provide more industry confidence in the findings until the unit failure data sets are
sufficiently large.
2.6.2. Unit Failure Data
Plant owners collect operations and maintenance data for their personal records and mandatory
reporting to NERC. Operations data includes flow rate, gross head, net head, wicket gate
opening, runner blade angle, and unit power, the latter of which is used to determine the number
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of unit starts. Maintenance data includes predictive maintenance monitoring data, outage event
data, and condition assessment data. The unit failure data will require mining the operation and
maintenance history to determine the operating time to component failure, ݔǡǡǡఠ .
HydroAMP project
HydroAMP started in 2001, provides a cohesive effort to develop a formalized method to guide
condition assessment at hydroelectric power plants. HydroAMP’s goals are outlined as:
2.6.2.1.

x
x
x
x

Development of long-term investment strategies
Prioritization of capital investments
Coordination of O&M budgeting processes and practices
Identification and tracking of performance goals (48)

HydroAMP meets these goals by establishing a single database to house equipment condition
monitoring data in a standardized format from all participating organizations and established
assessments and analyses used to help inform decision makers (48). HydroAMP concerns both
major powertrain components (governor, turbine, generator, exciter, transformers and circuit
breakers) and specific auxiliary components that are mission critical (Batteries, Compressed Air
Systems, Cranes, Emergency closure gates and valves, and surge arresters) (48).
There are two tiers of assessments in HydroAMP and two types of analyses. Tier 1 assessments
include collecting information to determine equipment condition (48). This includes physical
inspection and any maintenance testing results as well as operational history and component age
(48). Each component is scored from zero to ten and a data quality indicator score is used to
determine how reliable the information is (48). Tier 2 assessments are non-routine and generally
require special equipment, expertise or extended time (48). After performing these additional
tests, adjustments to the condition index score can be made (48).
A Type 1 analysis considers total cost, condition index score, the current year cost, incremental
annual maintenance difference, the phase the project is in and the achievability of the project
(48). The achievability is ranked as high, medium or low based on the “ability to undertake the
project in the immediate timeframe” (48). The four phases of project completion are study,
engineering, procurement or construction.
The Type 2 analysis introduces additional factors relating to “the consequence of undertaking or
not undertaking a repair or replacement action” (48). Type 2 analysis is used for expensive
pieces of equipment when there are several alternative action items based on budgetary
constraints (48). The additional factors used in the type 2 analysis can include (48):
x
x
x
x

Total outage duration
Marginal Value of Generation
Business, environmental, legal and safety issues
Risk Map Score
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x
x

Revenue at Risk
Priority Rank

Each component receives a score based on the consequence of failure, which is then combined
with the condition index rating to determine the risk map score. The risk map score is the
primary way to rank capital projects, although current year budget limits sometimes overrule the
risk scores (48). Additional economic analyses can be performed to determine the need for a
horizontal replacement programs for specific components (48). The risk map score does not
however take into account the expected dispatch patterns, and therefore risk incurred, if
replacement is delayed, a gap that we are working to fill.
North American Electric Reliability Corporation
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) collects information from all
power producers within the North American electric grids (Eastern Interconnect, Western
Interconnect, Texas Interconnect, and Quebec Interconnect), which includes the continental
United States and the southern provinces of Canada, for the Generating Availability Data System
(GADS). The software systems pc-GAR SI (standard issue) and pc-GAR MT (mean time)
enable users to access this data, although it protects against unit identification. Utilities report
data on either a voluntary or a mandatory basis based on plant size. Before 2011 all reporting
was voluntary, and in 2012, it became mandatory for power generating plants larger than 50
MW. Since 2013, all power-generating plants greater than 20 MW are now required to report to
NERC. This was a much-needed step that will provide a more comprehensive data set for future
failure-analysis research. There are however multiple shortcomings with the pc-GAR SI and pcGAR MT software and the way in which the data is presented.
2.6.2.2.

Data collected for GADS includes O&M data that details the amount of time spent in certain
dispatch states and the number of occurrences for each dispatch state including attempted unit
starts and actual unit starts. The reliability statistics as explained in appendix F of NERC’s data
reporting instructions are then calculated using this data. Our experience with the GADS
database has not been without complications. A report was submitted to the GADS Hydro
working group detailing some of these complications and solution strategies that NERC or
utilities can use to create a better data system. These include, but are not limited to incorrect or
incomplete designation of turbine type and orientation, turbine manufacturer and generator
manufacturer.

2.7. Hydroelectric Maintenance Strategies
Maintenance strategies currently used in the hydroelectric industry vary by plant owner and
component. Each owner uses a combination of management practices. The majority of the
hydropower industry has accepted the comprehensiveness of reliability centered maintenance
(RCM) as the best way to monitor critical components. Economic risk based assessment
(ERBA) is the most statistically inclined approach. Corrective maintenance, preventative
maintenance and predictive maintenance are incorporated into these two state of the art
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approaches, but still have roles for non-critical components that do not require the
comprehensiveness of RCM or ERBA as determined by the plant owner.
2.7.1. Corrective Maintenance
Corrective Maintenance requires action only in the case of component failure. Thus, it is known
by many as “run to failure”. The components that are assigned corrective maintenance can
usually be repaired on very small timescales, have redundant equipment, or are ancillary
equipment in the hydroelectric plant since the component failure can occur at any time thereby
reducing unit availability (47). If repair time and outage costs for planned and forced outages of
a component are similar, the strategic decision is to run the component until failure occurs.
2.7.2. Preventative Maintenance
Preventative Maintenance calls for routine maintenance at predetermined time intervals. The
time intervals are often provided from the original manufacturer, but can be changed based on
operating experience or to account for inactivity (47). Examples of time based maintenance
(TBM) activities for the generating unit include “visual inspections, cleaning, functional
tests…lubrication, oil tests, and governor maintenance” (49).
Visual inspections from TBM allow for condition assessments, which score the components on
equipment age, O&M history and other relevant condition indexes (CI). The CI score combined
with test results inform decision makers about necessary maintenance tasks (48). Condition
assessments are used in HydroAMP’s tier 1 analyses discussed in section 3.4.2.1. Condition
assessments are used throughout the industry to make fleet wide decisions on replacement
priority.
2.7.3. Predictive Maintenance
Predictive maintenance uses on-line monitoring systems to effectively track and predict
component degradation and ultimately failure. Examples of predictive maintenance monitoring
are cavitation measuring in turbines, temperature probes on insulated materials, rotor speed
measurement, partial discharge analysis for stator windings and air gap monitors that measure
the distance between the rotor and stator while in use (50). Use of predictive maintenance
reduces the dependence on preventative maintenance that requires intermittent scheduling of
inspections and assessments. These systems do require acquisition and installation costs that are
small compared to the cost of an outage (50).
2.7.4. Reliability Centered Maintenance
RCM was originally developed in the late 1960’s by the airline industry. RCM focuses on
preventing failures with the largest consequences. RCM determines the maintenance intervals
using actual unit data and component criticality (51). Since RCM is performed proactively, it
pairs well with Root Cause Analysis (RCA) that is done reactively because organizations can
“learn from reactive responses to become more proactive” (52). Accurate RCM decisions
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require a well-executed failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) to be available.
RCA and FMECA are discussed in section 3.7.
EPRI began using RCM to optimize maintenance tasks at Nuclear Power Generation Facilities in
1984 (51). The definition used by the EPRI RCM Users Group is:
“RCM analysis is a systematic evaluation approach for developing or optimizing a maintenance
program. RCM utilizes a decision logic tree to identify the maintenance requirements of
equipment according to the safety and operational consequences of each failure and the
degradation mechanism responsible” (51).
RCM asks the following seven questions in order to understand possible future failures:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

What are the functions of the equipment or process?
How can it fail to provide the function?
What causes each functional failure?
What are the effects of each functional failure?
How does each failure influence the goals?
What action should be taken to predict and prevent each failure?
What action should be taken if a proactive task cannot be determined? (52)

The answers to these questions may influence current preventative and predictive maintenance
strategies by eliminating old or establishing new inspections, functional tests and monitoring
devices (51). In this way, RCM optimizes the use of reactive, preventative and predictive
maintenance techniques at a plant.
2.7.5. Economic Risk Based Analysis
ERBA uses seven measures to determine the best economic decision but the significance of each
measure changes for each plant and for each component. These seven measures are
representative age, failure-probability curves, frequency of failure, type, extent and cost of the
repair method, value of lost revenue from downtime, extent of renewal introduced by the repair
and the economic discount rate (53). The Corps and Acres International developed ERBA
independently.
Representative age reflects the current condition of the part relative to expected calendar age of
components in similar condition. Weibull distribution curves are the failure-probability curves
used in their example. The frequency of failure can be derived from the failure-probability
curves. The extent of renewal introduced by the repair is the reduction in representative age that
occurs once the repair is complete. The type, extent and cost of the repair method, the value of
lost revenue from downtime and the economic discount rate all affect the total cost of the outage
(53). The lowest level elements considered in the analysis were generators and turbines and not
stator windings, wicket gates etc. ERBA offers comprehensive analysis but this tool has failed to
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spread outside of the Corps (53). Our models use similar underlying concept to determine
strategic life and optimal dispatch patterns.

2.8. Failure Analyses
Failure analyses are tools owners can use to understand the causes and effects of component
failures to help make informed decisions for future components maintenance and to determine
what signs of failure maintenance workers can expect. Root Cause Analysis and Failure Mode,
Effect and Criticality Analysis will be discussed within this section.
Without both an RCA and an FMECA neither RCM nor ERBA would not be possible. These
analyses can be performed independently in order to determine which components in the system
require additional attention. At that point, either RCM or ERBA can facilitate increased
reliability of the system.
2.8.1. Root Cause Analysis
After a failure occurs, RCA looks to identify the root cause(s) of the unit failure. RCA asks what
was the problem, what were the causes of the problem, and what actions should be taken to
prevent the problem from occurring (52)? Similar to RCM, RCA requires an understanding of
the function of the component, its operating history, critical failure modes and their failure
mechanisms (52). Once root causes are determined, analysis of each root cause provides updated
information to decision makers. An RCA can segregate failures to determine the propensity of
that failure mechanism to arise or to aid advanced statistical analyses (52).
One must be careful to distinguish between the failure mode and the failure mechanism. While
failure modes are the effects by which a failure is detected, failure mechanisms are the
mechanical, electrical, physical and chemical processes that cause failures to occur (54). NERC
lists possible failure modes as leaks, cracks, or fractures and failure mechanisms as erosion,
corrosion, or vibration (55). RCA will identify the failure mechanism that resulted in the
occurrence of failure.
2.8.2. Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis
A Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis is a five-step process with the goal of
identifying all possible failure modes and their effects on the system “in terms of financial, safety
and functional consequences” (56). This process indirectly determines which parts are failing
more often than expected and which parts could benefit from better monitoring. It is now
common practice in the nuclear power industry. The hydroelectric industry performs both
FMECA and the less laborious failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).
The nuclear power industry is one of the most developed industries concerning reliability
analysis along with the airline industry. Nuclear power plants operating restrictions differ
significantly from fossil fuel plants as they have routine shutdowns every 18 to 24 months for
refueling. It is wise for them to perform their maintenance tasks during this refueling window to
reduce the number of forced outages.
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As part of implementing a Reliability Centered Maintenance program at San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station in 1991, an FMEA was performed. Preventative maintenance
recommendations were used for non-critical components. The probability of failures that were
published were annualized values where high reliability is characterized by a value less than or
equal to ͳǤͲ ൈ ͳͲିସ and a high probability of failure is characterized by a value greater than
ͳǤͲ ൈ ͳͲିଷ (57).

2.9. Damage and Lifetime analyses
A majority of models in use currently presuppose the ability to identify the exact moment of unit
failure. Damage models accumulate damage expenses, sum the expenses and when the total
reaches 1.0, the component is said to have failed. Similarly, current equivalent operating hour
models set a failure threshold. Each operation counts towards that threshold differently based on
the coefficient for that operation. Once the threshold is reached, the component is said to have
failed.
2.9.1. Airline Industry Variable Selection
The airline industry offers an important case study on the importance of variable selection in
reliability modelling. By comparing the Weibull distributions using operating hours verses a
Weibull distribution using number of flights we can see that a more pronounced peak of failures
occurs when using number of flights (56). This bunching of failures enables clearer maintenance
decision making.
The difference is due to the correct assumption that airlines use planes to repeat routes. This
means that certain planes always take longer flights and other planes always take short flights.
The occurrence of the majority of airplane failures happens during takeoff and landing which
theoretically affirms this model. The components critical to these tasks are used twice per flight
independent of the total flight distance.
Similarly, for hydropower, a unit’s past and future dispatch patterns depend heavily on its MOP
as discussed in section 3.5.1. Specific plants endure a higher amount of flexible operations,
realized in higher unit starts per year and a large number of ramping events per year (10). Since
each hydroelectric unit’s operating-year is unique, equivalent operating hours, as discussed in
sections 3.8.4 and 4.2.1, offers an opportunity to normalize the unit failure data to account for
these differences in dispatch patterns.
2.9.2. Semi-Markov multi-nodal Deterioration Model
Once individual component failures are well understood, stakeholders look towards developing
analysis techniques that allow for a multi-unit or plant based approach. These techniques are
concerned with establishing decision-making schemes in order to analyze how to best spend
monetary resources to reduce financial risks. Both SINTEF Energy Research in Norway and
Hydropower Asset Management Partnership (HydroAMP) require large amount of condition
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monitoring data for their respective approaches but both incorporate expert estimates into their
deterioration models.
(39) introduced a semi-Markov multi-nodal deterioration and failure model for powertrain
components in hydropower plants. A lognormal distribution was used to model sojourn time
between the five states of component deterioration and thus the likelihood function takes the
form of the lognormal PDF.
The expert elicitation proposed is different from the expert elicitation hosted by Corps’ RMC and
HAC. It relies on the experts to estimate two data points instead of five, asking for the time it
takes for 10% of the population to move to the next state and for the average sojourn time of the
population. Assuming that there are systematic biases the 10th percentile changes to the 25th and
the average is taken as the 50th (median). The expert opinions and the failure data are combined
by maximizing the likelihood of all information obtained. A lognormal distribution is also used
instead of a Weibull distribution, but how the likelihood equations are combined is not affected.
ܮሺߠǢ ܱܨܰܫሻ ൌ ܮሺߠǢ ܲܺܧƬܣܶܣܦሻ ൌ ܮሺߠǢ ܲܺܧሻ ܮ כሺߠǢ ܣܶܣܦሻ
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One goal in developing this maintenance model was to break the vicious circle where “missing
data causes a lack of models, and missing models cause a lack of data [collection]” (39). A
covariate model where the distribution's parameter vector, ߠǡట , can be fine-tuned based on the
parameters below is suggested with the acknowledgement that this information is currently
scarce and/or hard to acquire.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Year of construction
Manufacturer
Material properties
Manufacturing method
Operating conditions (service hours, cycles, loading)
Type* and exact design of the equipment
Ambient conditions (silt in the water) (39)

2.9.3. Life Extension of Combined Systems
(10) details a deterministic damage model that can be used for energy storage systems used in
conjunction with a hydroelectric model. The example uses a three-unit hydroelectric plant that
has access to both a flywheel and a flow battery for energy storage purposes. A deterministic
model was used to incorporated damage coefficients for multiple co-variants (10). For
hydroelectric operation, these included time spent operating in the “rough zone” defined as 3050% capacity, start-stop events and small, medium and large ramping events defined as less than
10%, between 10% and 20%, and greater than 20% of capacity based on five-minute interval
power output data (10).
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The premise behind this life extension project is that one can extend the life of a unit by
preventing it from operating in more damaging dispatch states (AGC, start-stop cycling, high
ramp rates) near the end of the life. While this idea is similar to our goal, we understand that we
can only reduce the risk of failure rather than know the precise moment each component will
fail.
2.9.4. Applications of Equivalent Operating Hours
A study was presented to the Industrial Application of Gas Turbine Committee discussing life
cycle impact of steam injection on gas turbines. Steam injection increases mass flow and power
output of the unit but the negative effects are reduced thermal efficiency and component life.
Gas turbine baseline operating life curves assume no steam injection. When assuming oxidation
life as the critical failure mechanism it was determined that a 3% steam injection rate led to a
20% reduction in component life, but that this was economically viable due to the increased
power output (58).
A Lehigh University study developed a maintenance cost model for a combined cycle power
plant based on various operating scenarios. As with hydropower, the “variable O&M cost is not
always directly proportional to unit output but may also be impacted by operating mode” (59).
Therefore, based on current industry standards, equivalent operating hours (EOH) are used to
evaluate steam turbines. ABB, a power technology firm, uses equivalent operating hours for
their maintenance calculations on motors and gas and diesel generators. They value one cycle as
20 EOH and value one hour of variable speed drive operation as 1.2 EOH (60). Therefore, we
introduce a cyclic wear coefficient, a into our parameter vector that will convert the number of
cycles into EOH.
ߠప ሺ߰ሻ ൌ ൣߙො ǡ ߚመ ǡ ܽො ൧ ൌ ሼ  ܮሺߙ ǡ ߚ ǡ ܽ ȁܱܨܰܫሻሽ
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In hydroelectric plants, generator stators and their windings are commonly using EOH. EPRI’s
2001 report suggests a 40-year component life for the stator windings and determines that
increasing the number of unit starts by 150 per year would decrease the expected life to 31.5
years. It does not specify the baseline unit starts or the operating hours per year.
The coefficient used to convert unit starts to equivalent operating hours has been debated for
years. A 1984 EPRI study suggested that one unit start is equal to 10 EOH (13) (31). More
recently, a “rule of thumb” of five EOH per unit start has been used (30). Some dissenters in the
industry believe technological advances make this entire conversation null and void for pumper
storage units. (29) cites a 1980’s General Electric thermal aging test concluded that “cyclic
aging of the Class B and Class F insulation systems is less damaging than continuous isothermal
aging” (61). (29) reasons that in pump storage plants the thermal cooling time is too large and
therefore each start-stop doesn’t account for a full thermal cycle (29). However, our analysis
seeks to find the difference in degradation rate between a large number of cycles and a small
number of cycles and the “always on” continuous isothermal aging is not a condition of interest.
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Additionally, the example used by (29) are pump storage plants, while our research seeks
answers for conventional hydroelectric units and explicitly excludes pumped storage units where
the downtime may not be long enough.
(29) then seeks to disprove previous research that cites one start-stop event as equal to 16 service
hours. The 105-megavolt ampere Mt. Elbert Pumped Hydro Storage plant is used as an example.
(29) states these units have been “stopped and started once or twice a day for 26 years” and that
the two units have over 6,600 and 9,100 starts (29). For reference, 300 starts a year for 26 years
equals 7,800 starts. (29) then converts the units’ starts to equivalent operating hours (EOH) and
converts these EOH to calendar years at a rate near 2920 operating hours per year. The result is
that the age of the windings is calculated as 58 and 74 years. The flaw here is that industry
instinctively accounts for a certain number of unit starts per year in their current idea of unit age.
At the Corps’ expert elicitation, the assumption was made for daily start-stop and this is taken to
mean 300 start-stops per year. Therefore, over 26 years, each start less than 7,800 adds to the
remaining life while each start over 7,800 decreases the remaining life of the component. Using
this approach to EOH, the units are aged 23.5 and 28.7, a more reasonable estimate of the current
age of the windings since compared to the calendar age of 26, since as (29) noted, “the windings
are far from end of life” (29).
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3. Methods
The methodology discussed below outlines the models used to answer RQ1 and RQ2. RQ1 asks
to what extent additional start-stop cycling decreases the expected component life. RQ2 asks
how optimal unit dispatch patterns for plant reliability are affected by distinct parameter vectors.
The first step is to collect data from all sources. For this study, we will use TVA hydro data for
29 of their conventional hydroelectric plants and an expert elicitation. The Corps’ HAC and
RMC hosted a hydropower component expert elicitation in Portland, OR in January 2016. The
experts provided insight into the failure rates of six key powertrain components and multiple
technologies of each component. Notes taken from these meetings will be used in conjunction
with the unit-level failure data using methodology outlined by (39) and (62).
The analysis will be performed on two TVA units. The four-unit Chickamauga Hydropower
Facility (CHH) and the two-unit Norris Hydropower Facility (NOH) were selected based on the
criteria below:
x
x
x

All units at a facility must have similar capacity ratings
Kaplan turbines
Desire for one 2-unit facility and one 4+ unit facility

Nomenclature in this section uses i, j, k to denote the plant, unit, and component, for ݅ ൌ ͳ ൌ
 ܪܪܥand݅ ൌ ʹ ൌ ܱܰܪ,݆ଵ ൌ ͳݐͶ݆ݎଶ ൌ ͳʹݐand ݅ ൌ ͳ͵ݐ. The parameter vectors used
in this study and the optimal replacement point are denoted as ߠ ሺ߰ሻ and ܱܲ ሺ߰ሻ to show that
they are unique to the physical component discussed but are also a function of the failure
scenarios ߰ ൌ ͳݐͶ used in this sensitivity analyses. Likewise, the dispatch categories ܿ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ
and ݄ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ are unique to each unit but are a function of the failure scenarios ߰ ൌ ͳݐͶ and
dispatch scenarios  ݏൌ ͳ ͵ݐthat represent different hydrologic and grid demand scenarios.
The reliability index is denoted ܴܫ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ as it is unique to the plant but is a function of the
selected failure scenario and dispatch scenario. The current component age ܶǡǡ ሺ߰ሻ is unique to
the specific plant, unit and component, but is a function of the failure scenario due to changes in
the cycling coefficient.

3.1. Data Collection
Expert Elicitation data was collected from the USACE elicitation. Utilities have been slow in
providing their unit outage data as the data is disparate and not easily accessible or transferable.
In lieu of this data, we have imitated a fleetwide data set for the purpose of showing the model’s
capabilities. Although a component’s probability of failure depends on a variety of factors,
current O&M strategies only consider component age, visual inspections and on-line monitoring
systems and some rudimentary estimates for unit cycling damage. This project provides a
framework for measuring the significance of other easily measurable variables such as unit
cycles and service hours on all components.
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3.1.1. Utility O&M Databases
USBR, TVA and the Corps have been contacted about providing unit level dispatch data on a
small timescale. TVA has provided unit level operations for 29 hydroelectric plants (109 units)
with five-minute intervals. USBR provided hourly unit level dispatch data for the three-unit
Flaming Gorge plant for a previous research effort. No cost or maintenance data has been
provided by either utility. The Corps extended an invite for their expert elicitation but did not
provide any unit level data.
Hydroelectric utilities vary widely in the amount of data that is tracked and how easy it is to
access such data for research purposes. Although non-disclosure agreements are common and
expected in this field, there were still significant delays in the data acquisition phase of this
project. Reasons for delays are two-fold. Although the data is stored for internal use, it is
immobile when moving in large quantities. Additionally, the data is disparate and requires data
from multiple divisions of the utility. The data itself needs to be specific enough to determine
unit dispatch patterns over a length of time and show significant outage events. However, once
the time to failure values are calculated, the data no longer is attached to a certain unit and thus
the data set becomes anonymous before it is used to estimate the distribution parameters.
Similarly, the data published will not explicitly show what unit is each data point. This will
protect each utility from criticism if their components have experienced shorter lives but also
allow the industry to gain from these experiences.
Due to the significant delays in the acquisition of outage data, we proceeded with a simulated
fleetwide data set. This section details the methodology used to produce these estimated failure
data sets for each of the three replacement cases for each of the three modelled components.
Using the TVA fleet as an example fleet, we were provided with unit in service dates and
HMOD (Hydropower MODernization) dates. Using TVA blue books, the extend of HMOD
work was determined for each unit. For plants whose Blue Book publishing date precedes the
plants’ HMOD date some assumptions were made.
3.1.2. Expert Opinion Elicitation
Expert elicitations are commonly used in data weak industries to help guide decisions. They can
range from eliciting the most likely outcome to eliciting a range of outcomes. One function of
the Corps’ elicitation is to compare the expert estimates to their unit failure data to evaluate the
process to justify using the elicitation process for components where failure data is unavailable.
Expert Opinion Elicitation Process
The Corps’ HAC and RMC hosted an in-person hydropower component expert elicitation in
Portland, OR in January 2016 and invited experts from multiple utilities. The event was spread
out over three days. To allow experts to attend only their area of expertise, the schedule was sent
out in advance with the first day covered generators and exciters, the second day covering circuit
breakers and transformers and the third day covering turbines and governors. Though there was
a small group of interested parties gathered, only five to seven experts were given voting rights
3.1.2.1.
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(46). The technical integrator facilitated the event. The rest of the group was designated as
either observers or listeners based on their role (46). After a brief overview of how the Corps
would be using the elicited values included example elicitations, the technical integrator began
the exercise by having the experts and observers review the critical component list for that day
(46). Then for each component, the technical integrator requested a list of assumptions that the
experts wished to use for the component (46). While these changed slightly between
components, the assumptions of 50% duty cycle, daily start-stop interpreted as 300 unit starts per
year, and to not include pumped storage units were used for all components. Assumptions used
for one or more components are:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Normal and adequate maintenance
Clean, sheltered, no water
No extreme loading
No economic considerations
Exclude ancillary services
Installed properly
Normal environmental conditions
Clean air quality
No variable speed units
Annual IR inspections
Annual gas in oil testing
No asphaltic mica insulation
No alkali-aggregate interaction
Torque checked at each rewind
Operate within air balance gap
SF6 gas is properly handled
Doble electrical diagnostic testing every 6-7 years
Transformer loading at 30% nameplate capacity
Failure of transformer occurs in service or during testing
No “act of god” failures (electrical strikes)
Stator frame welds inspected periodically
GSU transformers load at 60% nameplate capacity
Bushing replacement qualifies as normal maintenance
Delivered and installed correctly
Replacement of breaker parts is not considered a failure
4-10-year interval for circuit breaker testing
Electrical testing on circuit breaker contacts every 9-10 years
Operates within design considerations
Technology has not become obsolete
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x
x
x

Mechanical and magnetically balanced
Time based maintenance for circuit breakers
Cooling system provides even temperature distribution

The experts then established the total time period, ܶ . The selection criteria for the total time
period were:
x
x
x

ܶ  ͳͲͲ to ensure a reasonable timeframe for asset management.
ܨሺܶ ሻ   Ǥ͵ʹto ensure that enough information was collected to be useful in developing
Weibull parameter estimates.
ܨሺͲǤͺ ൈ ܶ ሻ ൏ Ǥͻͻ to ensure that all five, and not just four, data points gathered were of
significance.

Of the 25 components analyzed, only three did not meet the second criteria. The time period of
stator frames and rotor spiders were capped at 100 years to meet the first criteria while SF6
circuit breakers were capped at 50 years due to the absence of historical use. Experts were asked
for five data points on the Cumulative Distribution Function, that as (63) suggests, were equally
spaced by ߂ ݕൌ

்ು
ହ

. Thus ݕఊ ൌ ߛ  ߛݎ݂ݕ߂ כൌ ͳǡ ǥ ͷ. For convenience experts used a total

time period, ܶ , value that is easily divisible by 5 so that ߂ ݕis an integer. ܶ values selected
included 25, 40, 50, 60, 75, and 100. Each expert submitted estimates of five points on the CDF
curve to the nearest 1/100 using 0.0 to represent no chance of failure and 1.0 to represent certain
failures. These five estimates represent ܨ൫ݕఊ ൯݂ ߛݎൌ ͳǡ ǥ ͷ. The median of the final estimates
was recorded for future use and for obscurity of each expert’s individual estimate. Use of the
median in place of the mean aligns with the Corps plans to use the median values for their
analysis and gives less weight to outliers. The median values for select components for each
interval is in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1 Corps Expert Elicited Values: the 3 components analyzed are shown, 25 were elicited

Corps Expert Elicitation Jan 2016
Component Part or Description
Rotor
Windings
Turbine
Kaplan
Component Part or Description
Stator
Windings >6900, multi-turn

CFD Median Estimates
F(20) F(40) F(60) F(80)
0.01
0.05
0.25
0.4
0.05
0.15
0.4
0.6
F(10) F(20) F(30) F(40)
0.03
0.1
0.3
0.65

F(100)
0.65
0.95
F(50)
0.93

Experts submitted five values to the technical integrator along the CDF curve expressing their
opinion of the probability a unit would normally fail by time ݕఊ ݂ ߛݎൌ ͳǡ ǥ ͷ. These values
were then shared with the group by the technical integrator and then the room was opened for a
38

guided discussion led by the technical integrator (46). This discussion included the experts
recounting failures at particular plants that informed their opinions and developing additional
assumptions. The experts were asked to once again estimate the CDF if their opinion changed
during the discussion (46). After the second round of estimates was complete, the moderator
recorded how confident each expert was in the median estimates of the group (46). Acceptable
responses were low, medium-low, medium, medium-high, and high. These confidence values
will be used to weight the failure data against the expert elicited values (46).
Transforming Expert Opinions into a Parameter Vector
There are many methods for using expertly elicited values in reliability engineering, but our
options are limited by our desire to use MLE to combine expert opinions with actual failure data.
Methodology used by (63) for maintenance intervals assumes a uniform distribution of failures
within each interval. The uniform distribution says that if ߂ ݕൌ ͳͲ, the probability of failure is
constant from (0, 10] and (10,20]. The failure probability within each interval is equal to the
fraction of the population that is expected to fail in the interval divided by the total time of the
interval per the expert elicitation. Using ߛ to designate the interval number, the failure rate is
expressed as:
3.1.2.2.

߮ሺݐ ሻ ൌ

ி൫௬ം ൯ିி൫௬ംషభ ൯
௱௬

݂݅ݕఊିଵ ൏ ݐ   ݕఊ ǡߛ ൌ ͳǡ ǥ ǡͷ
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Since we desire to integrate ߮ሺݐ ሻ it is useful to visualize the piecewise equation.
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 ݕଷ
 ݕସ
 ݕହ

To perform an MLE of expert estimates we need to estimate artificial failure points. In
determining that 100 data points would be the simplest amount to estimate, these failures will
correspond to the each 1/100th of the probability estimates. As with all pdf curves, the area under
ஶ
the curve is equal to unity. That is  ߮ሺݐ ሻ݀ ݐൌ ͳ. Thus, at any point in time ݐ , the area under
௧

the curve to the left of ݐ is expressed as  ߮ሺݐ ሻ݀ ݐis equal to the fraction of the population
expected to fail.
Therefore, each estimated failure,ݔ௪ , occurs at some point t where

௪ିଵ
ଵ

௧

௪

൏  ߮ሺݐ ሻ݀ ݐ ଵ.

However, in order to accurately estimate where the artificial failure occurs we assume it occurs
at the midpoint.
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௧

ݔ௪ ൌ ݐ  ݁ݎ݄݁ݓ ߮ሺݐ ሻ ݀ ݐൌ

௪ିǤହ
ଵ

݂ ݓݎൌ ͳǡ ǥ ǡͳͲͲ
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௧

This results in the use of ߔሺݐ ሻ ൌ  ߮ሺݐ ሻ݀ ݐto simplify this process. Since each piece of ݑሺݐ ሻ
has a uniform failure rate the integral is easy to calculate. Using the piecewise notation, the
integrated function for the first three intervals can be written as:
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In long form, this gets out of hand quite quickly. However, the terms without t can be
simplified:
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With the assumption that ܨሺݕ ሻ ൌ Ͳ the equations can be simplified further.
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Upon expanding for use in all five intervals the reduced CDF equation is:
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The next step is to convert this into a concise equation that represents all five intervals. This is
done by introducing ߛ to represent the intervals.
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we can obtain the estimated time to failure. We must re-arrange the

equation such that ݔ௪ is isolated.
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െ ܨ൫ݕఊିଵ ൯ step 2: subtract ܨ൫ݕఊିଵ ൯
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Now that the bounds ̶݂݅ݕఊିଵ ൏ ݔ௪   ݕఊ ǡ ߛ ൌ ͳǡ ǥ ǡͷ̶ are not useful since we are solving for
ݔ௪ we must define new bounds. We propose:
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These time to failure values, ݔ௪ , can be input into the likelihood function such that the parameter
vector can be maximized. However, we must still account for suspended data. There are ͳͲͲ כ
൫ͳ െ ܨሺܶ ሻ൯ suspended data points. All of these data points have a suspension time of ܶ as this
is the latest date that we have an estimate of survival.
The parameter vector, ߠ ሺ߰ሻ, will be calculated using the expert values in conjunction with the
data driven approach. It is important for researchers to compare their proposed model against
human experts, ߠ ሺ߰ ൌ Ͷሻ, or other current techniques instead of simply comparing against a
dumb procedure such as run to failure (64). For this reason, the importance of the expert
elicitation is two-fold as it both informs the combined distribution and offers a baseline of
knowledge for comparison.

3.2. Statistical Methodology
The statistical methodology will incorporate data from a variety of sources as seen in Figure 5.
Using data package 1, the expert parameter vector can be estimated. Data package 2 includes all
unit level data collected. More significantly, by using data packages 1 and 2, we can arrive at
our final parameter estimation that will incorporate unit start-stop events into the distribution.
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3.2.1. Weibull Distribution and Equivalent Operating Years
A statistical model will be created using the Weibull distribution. The model will convert unit
starts to equivalent operating hours using equation 3-14. Using the assumption of 50% duty
cycle and 300 unit starts per year as discussed at the expert elicitation. The EOHs are then
converted to Equivalent Operating Years (EOY) using equation 3-15. Figure 3-1 shows the flow
of information in determining the final parameter estimations.
ܪܱܧǡǡ ൌ ܽ ܿ כǡǡ  ݄ǡǡ
ܻܱܧǡǡǡట ൌ

ாைுǡೕǡೖ
ଷכೖ ା

ఴళలబ
మ

ൌ

ೖ כǡೕǡೖ ାǡೕǡೖ
ଷכೖ ାସଷ଼
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In future analyses, when using more than two covariates equation 3-14 will be modified as
shown in equation 3-16 and equation 3-15 will be modified based on the assumptions made by
the intended user.
ܪܱܧǡǡǡట ൌ ܽǡଵ ܿ כǡǡǡଵ   ڮ ܽǡ ܿ כǡǡǡ  ݄ǡǡ

Corps
Expert
Elicitation

Data Package 1: CDF estimates
for five equal intervals of the
component lifetime

Weighting
Technique

Three Failure
Scenarios

Weibull Parameter
Estimation MLE yields
ߠ ሺͶሻ

Final Parameter
Estimations for
ሺͳሻǡ
ߠ
ߠ ሺʹሻǡ ߠ ሺ͵ሻ to
compare against ߠ ሺͶሻ

Simulated
TVA fleet
outage data
TVA fleet
operating data
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Data Package 2: O&M
Data: component age,
unit starts, service
hours, and outage
history

Weibull Parameter
Estimation MLE yields
outage data only
results

Figure 3-1 Flow of Data Inputs
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3.2.2. Parameter Estimation Techniques
MLE is used to estimate the Weibull distribution parameters, ߙǡ ߚǡ ܽ݊݀ܽ, the coefficient of
cyclic wear. The expert estimated likelihood function uses the artificial failure and suspension
times ݔ௪ and ݖ௨ :
ഁೖ

ܮா ൫ߠ ሺͶሻ൯ ൌ ܮሺߙǡ ߚȁܲܺܧሻ ൌ
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௫ೢ ఉೖ ିଵ ቆି൬ ഀೖ ൰
ఠ
ς௪ୀଵ ቀ ቁ ቀ ቁ

ఈೖ
ఈೖ

ఉೖ

ቇ

ೠ

ഁೖ

ቆି൬ ൰ቇ
ςఓ௨ୀଵ  ഀೖ
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The TVA fleet imitation failure and suspension data is converted to EOY using equation 3-15
and then input into equation 3-19 (62).
ܮ் ሺߠ ሻ ൌ ܮ் ሺߙ ǡ ߚ ǡ ܽ ȁܦሻ ൌ ܮ் ሺߙ ǡ ߚ ǡ ܽ หݔଵ ǡ ǥ ݔఠ ǡ ݖଵ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݖఓ ൯ [ 3-18 ]
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While performing MLE using Microsoft Excel’s solver, bounds will be given to the parameters
ߙǡ ߚǡ ܽ to speed up computational efforts. Bounding ߚ between 0.1ܽ݊݀ͷ for all components.
Bounds for ߙ provides adequate space to find the global maximum and vary significantly by
component. The cyclic wear coefficient ܽ will have an upper bound of 10 and a lower bound of
zero to prevent negative values because they would suggest that start-stop cycling enhances the
effective life instead of diminishing it.
3.2.3. Confidence Weighting
Our proposed model is dependent on two unique, though dependent sources of information that
are used in the parameter estimates. Current industry best practices rely solely on the expert
elicitation. With an aging workforce, it is important that a dependable unit failure data driven
model is functional in the short term. To ensure industry confidence in the models, the data
sources must be weighted to favor expert opinion when little unit failure data is available and
favor unit failure data when it is abundant. The accuracy of the statistical models is very
dependent on the sample size of the data. Thus, unit failure data will be weighted by calculating
the Average Coefficient of Variation, ACV, based on the number of data points available. In
literature, experts are weighted using the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the estimate of
the mean (39). Since expert estimates of the Weibull distribution does not estimate a mean like
the log-normal distribution, we choose to weight the expert values using the average expert
confidence, ܧ since it is the “only available measure of the quality of a decision” (44) and
increasing the number of participating experts does not improve model accuracy (44).
Accuracy of models are shown through the upper and lower confidence bounds, known jointly as
the confidence interval,  ܫܥൌ ሾܤ ǡ ܤ ሿ and bound ratio, BR = ܤ Ȁܤ . The confidence bounds
are dependent upon what percent of possible outcomes are to be included within the bounds.
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80%, 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels are typical in statistical modelling and one-sided and
two-sided bounds have specific purposes. There is no prior work in statistical failure modelling
in the hydroelectric industry, so we will use 80% two-sided confidence bounds for our work,
which suggests that there is a 10% probability that the actual parameter value is lower than the
lower bound of the parameter estimate and a 10% probability that the actual parameter value is
higher than the upper bound of the parameter estimate.
Where ACV is the average coefficient of variation. From (65) and (66) we can assume the β
parameter takes a lognormal distribution around the MLE β parameter. ACV is a measure of the
relative uncertainty of the estimated β parameter. From simulations performed by (66) the input
value of α had no bearing on the estimated β parameter and the standard deviation of β increases
proportionally with β when sample size is constant. By plotting the results of the sample size
analysis, a power function equation for ACV is determined.
ఙ

 ܸܥܣൌ   ൌ ͳǤͶͺͳͺ ൈ ݊ିǤହସ
ఉ

for all ߚ
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To isolate the standard deviation, we bring the β value to the left-hand side of the equation.
ߚመ ൈ  ܸܥܣൌ ߪ

[ 3-21 ]

Since the standard deviation is present in the log normal distribution used in (39) but not in our
Weibull distribution, we must alter our likelihood equation 3-12 to include standard deviation.
ି
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Factoring out β and moving it to the left-hand side of the equation does not affect the results of
the MLE. We leave ACV in the equation to provide weights to the two sets of knowledge.
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Now that we can insert standard deviation into our equation through using ACV which is
dependent only on sample size, it is convenient to use when comparing the variability of multiple
data sources. Thus, in our modelling of multiple hydroelectric powertrain components, we use
ACV to provide guidance for the relative weight given to the expert opinions and unit failures.
As experts’ confidence increases, we assume that the CI decreases. Thus, a higher confidence
should correlate with a smaller BR and a lower confidence with a larger BR. Expert confidence
was provided on a 5-point subjective scale that we converted to quantifiable values between 1
and 9. There may be some ambiguity here as it was not until part way through the elicitation
process that experts started using medium-low and medium-high to express their confidence.
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Each participating expert gave their confidence and using the values above we convert ܧ to a
number of failure points for an 80% confidence interval simply, ݊ ൌ ͷ ܧ כ . This result can then
be used to calculate ACV and BR. Furthermore, this provides a method to compare the expert
confidence in the median of the groups estimates to the confidence the unit failure data will
provide based on the number of data points that are collected.
To determine which data set has more weight we must look beyond ACV because the expert
opinions always give 100 artificial data points but the size of the unit failure data is constantly
changing. Figure 3-3 depicts the number of actual failure points needed to give equal weight to
the two data sources. This is determined by equating the total weight of all unit failure data to
the 100 artificial failure data points which are weighting by the average expert confidence. Since
ACV is present in the denominator and the number of failure data points required is dependent of
the average expert confidence this equation takes the shape of a square root function.
This would suggest at the utility level more weight is given to experts but when unit failure data
is shared, it can become powerful enough to use for asset management decision making
purposes. As the number of actual failure data points collected increases, the weight of ܮா
decreases. The influence of expert opinions will never disappear, but rather will become less
influential as the correct data is collected.
A coefficient of 5 is used as a rule of thumb. The goal was for there to be a significant difference
between ܸܥܣሺܧ ൌ ͳሻܸܽ݊݀ܥܣሺܧ ൌ ͻሻ. Figure 3-2 graphs equation 3-20. A different value
for the coefficient can be chosen based on how an Asset Manager desires to weight the two
knowledge sources. Based on the desired confidence level, one can determine the number of
actual failures required for the results to be statistically significant (66). Until that required
number of failures occurs, it is justifiable to put more weight towards the expert opinions.
Figures 3-4 through 3-11 depicts how the failure curve will change based on the weight given to
each data source and the sources original estimates. Given the same ߙ, but different ߚ, equal
weights will produce a parameter estimate that is near the arithmetic mean but the results are
more complex when ߙ varies between data sources.
These graphs were computed by first selecting the ߙ and ߚ values and then using Monte Carlo
method to create failure data. Using the Monte Carlo failure data from the two distributions the
weighting method was used to determine seventeen possible weighting scenarios which are
shown for each of the four initial pairs of distribution parameters. The weighting scenarios
express the result of two experts when expert one expresses their confidence as a nine, and
expert two varies their confidence from one to nine and then is repeated for expert one’s
confidence varies from one to nine and expert two’s confidence is constant at nine. This method
was repeated for four different sets of parameter estimates, when ߙ is constant but ߚ varies,
when ߙ varies but ߚ is constant, and two sets where both ߙ and ߚ vary. ߙ ൌ ͳ and ߚ ൌ ͵ were
used as the median for which the estimates are centered around.
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Effect of Weighting:
Est 1: β= 2.8 α=1 vs Est 2: β = 3.2 α = 1
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Figure 3-4 Weighting pdf: Constant Scale, Varying Shape
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Figure 3-5 Weighting CDF: Constant Scale, Varying Shape
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Effect of Weighting:
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Figure 3-6 Weighting pdf: Varying Scale, Constant Shape
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Figure 3-7 Weighting CDF: Varying Scale, Constant Shape
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Effect of Weighting:
Est 1: β= 2.8 α=0.9 vs Est 2: β = 3.2 α = 1.1
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Figure 3-8 Weighting pdf: Increased Scale, Increased Shape
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Figure 3-9 Weighting CDF: Increased Scale, Increased Shape
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Effect of Weighting:
Est 1: β= 3.2 α=0.9 vs Est 2: β = 2.8 α = 1.1
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Figure 3-10 Weighting pdf: Increased Scale, Decreased Shape
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Figure 3-11 Weighting CDF: Increased Scale, Decreased Shape
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3.2.4. Failure Scenarios
The failure scenarios are built on imitating the TVA fleet’s outages. Three failure scenarios will
allow for unique parameter vectors that can be compared against the expert only knowledge
base. These failure scenarios will present a case of very rare failures, base case, and very
common failures. Using the TVA HMOD data we attained three values, total in service age,  ்ܣ,
age since HMOD, ܣுெைଵ , and age until HMOD, ܣுெைଶ , and yes/no results on if work was
performed on the stator windings, rotor windings and turbine runner during HMOD.
 ்ܣൌ

ୡ୳୰୰ୣ୬୲ୢୟ୲ୣି୧୬ୱୣ୰୴୧ୡୣୢୟ୲ୣ

ܣுெைଵ ൌ

ଷହǤଶହ
ୌୈୢୟ୲ୣି୧୬ୱୣ୰୴୧ୡୣୢୟ୲ୣ

ܣுெைଶ ൌ

ଷହǤଶହ
ୡ୳୰୰ୣ୬୲ୢୟ୲ୣିୌୈୢୟ୲ୣ
ଷହǤଶହ

? ்ܣൌ  ܣுெைଵ  ܣுெைଶ
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Next, to divide  ்ܣinto component lifetimes, requires an estimate of the number of component
replacements each unit has endured. The number of total components used at a unit, is equal to
one plus the number of replacements,ɘǡǡ ሺ߰ሻ.
If work was performed on the component at HMOD, then it is easy to calculate ݖǡǡǡଵ ሺ߰ሻ, but
we must still estimate the lifetime of previous components ݔǡǡǡଵ ሺ߰ሻǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݔǡǡǡఠ ሺ߰ሻ. If work was
not performed at HMOD then we must calculate the ages of components
ݔǡǡǡଵ ሺ߰ሻǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݔǡǡǡఠ ሺ߰ሻǡ ݖǡǡǡଵ ሺ߰ሻ.
The expert elicitation estimated 65% of stator winding failures occur by 40 years. To determine
the number of stator windings that a unit has had we used nested if statements to assign ߱
components to each unit. If ܣுெைଵ  ͷͲ, ߱ǡǡଵ ሺʹሻ ൌ ʹǡ if ʹͷ ൏ ܣுெைଵ ൏ ͷͲ, ߱ǡǡଵ ሺʹሻ ൌ ͳ
and if ܣுெைଵ ൏ ʹͷ, ߱ǡǡଵ ሺʹሻ ൌ Ͳ. If the stator windings were replaced at HMOD, ߱ǡǡଵ ሺʹሻ
was increased by one. Similarly, with rotor windings the expert elicitation estimated 65% of
failures occur by 100 years. Thus, we used 90 years as the cutoff between ߱ǡǡଶ ሺʹሻ ൌ
Ͳܽ݊݀߱ǡǡଶ ሺʹሻ ൌ ͳ and again increased ߱ by one if the rotor windings had work done during
HMOD. For Kaplan turbines, the expert elicitation estimated 40% of failures by 60 years.
Although potentially low, we used 60 years as the cutoff between ߱ǡǡଷ ሺʹሻ ൌ Ͳܽ݊݀߱ǡǡଷ ሺʹሻ ൌ
ͳ and again increased ߱ by one if the turbine runner had work done during HMOD.
Additionally, it was assumed that all TVA units were Kaplan turbines and had multi-turn stator
windings 6900+kV as a specific list of unit specifications has not yet been made available.
The component lives ݓሺ߰ሻ ൌ ͳǡ ǥ ǡ ߱ǡǡ were then assigned lifetimes using MLE and the expert
estimated Weibull parameters. This was performed using Microsoft Excel’s solver add-in as
discussed in section 2.4. If age,ݖଵ was unknown, it was used to unify the sum of component
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ages to the unit age. If ݖଵ was known via HMOD, then ݔǡǡǡ௪ ሺ߰ሻwas used to unify the sum of
component ages to the unit age. Though not ideal, in order to reduce repeat values ݔǡǡǡ௪ ሺ߰ሻ ൌ
ݔǡǡǡ௪ିଵ ሺ߰ሻ  ͳ. These ages, ݔଵǡଵǡଵǡଵ ሺ߰ሻǡ ǥ ǡ ݔǡǡǡ௪ ሺ߰ሻ, along with their 2004 operating history
were used in the MLE to determine the parameter vector while noting the current component
age, ݖǡǡǡଵ, as right censored since a failure has not occurred.
To determine the sensitivity of the model, as described earlier, we must alter the base case to
reflect a best replacement case and a worst replacement case and then use MLE to once again
determine ݔǡǡǡ௪ ሺ߰ሻ . To do this, the number of replacements was decreased by one to reflect
the best replacement case or increased by one to reflect the worst replacement case.
߱ǡǡ ሺ߰ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ  ߱ǡǡ ሺ߰ ൌ ʹሻ െ ͳ
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߱ǡǡ ሺ߰ ൌ ͵ሻ ൌ  ߱ǡǡ ሺ߰ ൌ ʹሻ  ͳ
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This method does require some assumptions but for our purposes the possible errors induced by
the assumptions are minimal. These include using a small operating history to describe the entire
operating history. This can be impacted by minor outages, but 2004 was chosen since it is the
first full year of 5-minute operating data and for CHH, NOH and two other TVA plants the
generating hours fall within the interquartile range for data collected from 2000-2015. We also
assume that no major outages have occurred to a component since HMOD if work was
performed on the component at HMOD. These estimates also do not take into account repair
time for any component. Without more impactful data outage length data from TVA, we cannot
make assumptions about repair time. In this case we also assume that all historical failures are
relevant to the current components. It is known that this is false, yet it is difficult to establish a
cut-off date and thus for this sensitivity analysis all component failures were deemed relevant.

3.3. Strategic Life Model Methodology
The SLM depicted in Figure 3-2 will answer RQ1 by determining the strategic life of the
component in calendar years based on the expected dispatch patterns. “Design Reference
Missions” can be used to determine the impact of a unit changing from set point dispatch to
flexible operations (23). The model can also be used to compare the expert estimated strategic
life and our newly obtained prediction for strategic life based on the same set of future dispatch
patterns. The SLM requires the estimation of select coefficients from cost databases and expert
judgement. The cost of a forced outage (CF) and the cost of a planned outage (CP) for specific
components would be optimal, but determining the ratio between the two will suffice. The model
determines the optimal planned replacement interval by locating the minimum cost per unit time
based on the parameter vector, CF and CP (67).
ܷܶܲܥሺܻܱܧȁߙǡ ߚǡ ܽሻ ൌ

ು כோሺாைሻାಷ כ൫ଵିோሺாைሻ൯
ಶೀೊ

బ

ோሺሻௗ
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This cost function evaluates the effect of using distinct dispatch patterns and the opportunity cost
of using one instead of another. The denominator of equation 3-29 is found using numerical
integration’s midpoint rule with a convergence value of ͳǤͲ ൈ ͳͲି . Equation 3-29 is evaluated
in 0.1 EOY increments. This increment will produce clear and precise results while resolving
the global minimum in an efficient manner.
The SLM does not explicitly use repair time, rather repair time is one part of the outage costs.
Current economic input variables are only rough estimates as the author expects a plant owner to
have access to accurate estimates of outage costs that are specific to the hydroelectric unit being
examined. This model does not differentiate between labor costs and component costs as labor
costs can be complicated based on if salaried in-house staff is used or if sub-contractors are hired
on a job by job basis.

Final Parameter
Vector ߠ ሺ߰ሻ
Planned and
Forced
Outage Costs:
 ܨܥൌ ܥி Ȁܥ

Expert Parameter
Vector ߠ ሺͶሻ

Strategic Life Model,
minimize CPUT

Average
dispatch
pattern in
EOY

Results Obtained:
x

optimal replacement interval and
average component life for each
parameter vector given an
expected average future dispatch

Figure 3-12 Strategic Life Model

3.4. Conditional Reliability Model Methodology
Conditional reliability determines the probability that a component will remain failure free over
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬǡǡ . Figure 3-3 shows how the Weibull
time ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ
ܻܱܧǡǡ , given that it has been failure free for ܻܱܧ
distribution with the ߠ parameter vector will be used alongside other data inputs. After
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providing data on historical unit starts and service hours endured, this model requires the user to
input two additional parameters:
x
x

Operating Horizon: y: the length of future time that this risk analysis considers
Future dispatch pattern (unit starts per year and service hours per year)

The conditional reliability for individual components can be multiplied together to determine the
system reliability envisioning the entire plant as a system of components in series. This value
describes the probability that all modelled components at plant i will be failure free for the given
horizon time. Our sensitivity analyses incorporated four different Weibull parameter vectors for
each of the three components. These parameter vectors were then used to influence dispatch
decisions at both four-unit CHH and two-unit NOH using three historical dispatch scenarios.

Future dispatch
in EOY
Timeframe,
ݕி , in calendar
years

Final Parameter
Estimation ߠ ሺ߰ሻ

Conditional Reliability
Risk Model

Past dispatch
for unit in
EOY

Results Obtained:
The risk of failure for the components based
on operating horizon and dispatch pattern
Figure 3-13 Conditional Reliability Model

3.4.1. Single Component Conditional Reliability Model
The single component model output is the risk incurred by the component based on a spectrum
ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦǡǡ ܻܱܽ݊݀ܧ
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬǡǡ respectfully
of dispatch patterns using equations 3-31, 3-32, and 3-33.ܻܱܧ
represent the equivalent operating years of the component in the future time frame and in the
ሬԦǡ represent the expected number of cycles per year and the expected
historical sense. ܿԦǡ and݄
operating hours per year for the timeframe of the analysis. By calculating the risk of failure
using conditional reliability and expected dispatch patterns we can use a poly-Weibull
distribution to assess multiple components at once for a unit level reliability calculation. This
requires using the kth component’s unique α, β, and ܽ values (41) . The historical dispatch,
ശሬǡǡ vary by component based on the component in service date. In addition to
ܿശǡǡ and ݄
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ശሬǡǡ the component’s age,ܻܱܧ
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬǡǡ varies by the components coefficient of cyclic wear,
ܿശǡǡ and ݄
ܽ ሺ߰ሻ.
ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ

ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬ

ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦǡǡ หܻܱܧ
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬǡǡ ൯ ൌ ͳ െ ோ൫ாைǡౠǡౡ ାாைǡೕǡೖ൯
݇ݏ݅ݎ ൌ ͳ െ ܴ൫ܻܱܧ
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬ
൯
ோ൫ாைǡೕǡೖ

ିቆ

݇ݏ݅ݎ ൌ ͳ െ ݁

ഁೖ
ഁೖ
ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬ
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬ
ಶೀೊ
ಶೀೊ
ǡౠǡౡ శಶೀೊǡೕǡೖ
ǡೕǡೖ
ቇ ିቆ
ቇ 
ഀೖ
ഀೖ

ሬԦǡೕ
Ԧ כೖ ା

ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦǡǡ ൌ   כǡೕ
Given: ܻܱܧ
ଷכ

ೖ ାସଷ଼

ശሬ

ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬǡǡ ൌ ౡ כശǡೕǡೖାǡೕǡೖ
ܻܱܧ
ଷכ ାସଷ଼
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3.4.2. Multi-component Conditional Reliability Model
To step from a single component calculation to a plant level model, we first must understand the
unit level model. Using poly-Weibull conditional reliability shown in equation 3-37, is useful
when analyzing a single unit and suffices for one-unit plants which includes 6 of TVA’s 29
plants but only a small fraction of their total generating capacity. Upon acquiring detailed outage
information that includes the prevalent failure mechanism, Weibull parameters can be calculated
for each individual failure mode of a component in a similar fashion.

݇ݏ݅ݎ ൌ ͳ െ ܴ ൫ݐǡ ߠ ሺ߰ሻ൯ ൌ ͳ െ ς௩ୀଵ ܴ ൌ ͳ െ ݁

ି σೡೖసభቌቆ

ഁೖ
ഁ
ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬ
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬ
ಶೀೊǡೕǡೖ శಶೀೊ
ಶೀೊǡೕǡೖ ೖ
ǡೕǡೖ
ቇ ିቆ
ቇ ቍ
ഀೖ
ഀೖ
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To maximize the reliability of the CHH facility, we seek the dispatch pattern that optimizes the
reliability of the 4-unit, 3-component system while meeting a required generation total. This
increases the number of unique reliability equations from 3 to 12 for CHH. Likewise, for the
NOH facility, we have a 2-unit, 3-component system with 6 unique reliability equations.
Implementation of this model requires knowledge of previous operating history, our Weibull
parameter estimation, and an operating horizon for the study.
3.4.3. Dispatch Scenarios
After reviewing CHH’s and NOH’s operating history, operating years 2004, 2005, and 2007 will
be used to describe three unique operating scenarios. The unit starts and operating hours
recorded in each operating year will be used as bounds in the Multicomponent CRM sensitivity
analysis as the most reliable operation is no dispatch, the model must force all dispatch hours and
unit starts to be assigned.
ܥ ሺݏሻ ൌ σఛୀଵ ܿ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ

[ 3-38 ]

ܪ ሺݏሻ ൌ σఛୀଵ ݄ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ

[ 3-39 ]
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The total number of unit starts and operating hours for the plant for each operating scenario are
distributed among the units bounded by plant specific operating ratios ݎଵǡ and ݎଶǡ such that the
least active unit must provide a portion of the load that the most active unit provides. This
establishes real world flexibility scenarios as the closer those bounds are to unity, the closer we
move to equal run time and increased flexibility.
3.4.4. Problem Setup
We will use the multicomponent CRM to produce two separate groups of results. First, we will
determine how close the actual dispatch patterns were to the recommended reliable dispatch
patterns for each of the three dispatch scenarios and the subsequent change in reliability
predicted by the expert case,߰ ൌ Ͷ, and the base case, ߰ ൌ ʹ, given ܶǡǡ are set accordingly to
represent the component age at the beginning of the dispatch scenario. Secondly, we will
determine how the dispatch patterns should be allocated if they were to occur in calendar year
2017, as operating data goes through September 2016.
The problem can be described as ʹ ൈ ݆ decision variables that are optimized to maximize the
plant reliability function. Input values include the study horizon, y = 1, component specific
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬǡǡ ሺ߰ሻ and component specific Weibull Parameters ߙ ǡ ߚ ǡ ܽ
equivalent operating ages, ܻܱܧ
ഁೖ
ೌౡ כౙǡౠ శǡౠ
ശሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬ
శ౯כ
ಶೀೊ
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ۇ
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షۈ
ۋ
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For the historical reliability model, we can calculate a Reliability Index value to quantify the
increased risk associated with how plant’s units were actually dispatched. This RI results in a
value between 0 and 100 and uses the actual dispatch patterns, the optimal dispatch for reliable
operations and the worst-case dispatch for reliable operations while keeping the dispatch totals
constant.
ܴܫ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ ൌ

ோǡೌೠೌ ሺటǡ௦ሻିோǡ ሺటǡ௦ሻ
ோǡೌೣ ሺటǡ௦ሻିோǡ ሺటǡ௦ሻ

[ 3-41 ]

56

4. Results
Results of the historical dispatch analysis of CHH and NOH that were used to determine the
current component ages is described in section 4.1. The resultant parameter vectors are
discussed in section 4.2. The results of the SLM for use in operating cost calculation is found in
section 4.3. Section 4.4 details the results of the single component CRM while sections 4.5 and
4.6 detail the results of the Historical and Future multicomponent CRM.
Nomenclature in this section uses i, j, k to denote the plant, unit, and component, for ݅ ൌ ͳ ൌ
 ܪܪܥand݅ ൌ ʹ ൌ ܱܰܪ, ݆ଵ ൌ ͳݐͶ݆ݎଶ ൌ ͳʹݐand ݅ ൌ ͳ͵ݐ. The parameter vectors
used in this study and the optimal replacement point are denoted as ߠ ሺ߰ሻ and ܱܲ ሺ߰ሻ to show
that they are unique to the physical component discussed but are also a function of the failure
scenarios ߰ ൌ ͳݐͶ used in this sensitivity analyses. Likewise, the dispatch categories ܿ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ
and ݄ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ are unique to each unit but are a function of the failure scenarios ߰ ൌ ͳݐͶ and
dispatch scenarios  ݏൌ ͳ ͵ݐthat represent different hydrologic and grid demand scenarios.
The reliability index is denoted ܴܫ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ as it is unique to the plant but is a function of the
selected failure scenario and dispatch scenario. The current component age ܶǡǡ ሺ߰ሻ is unique to
the specific plant, unit and component, but is a function of the failure scenario due to changes in
the cycling coefficient.

4.1. Historical Dispatch Analysis
In order to understand how TVA has previously operated CHH and NOH units we analyzed
previous operating years. Wet (2013) and dry (2007 & 2008) years have a significant impact on
the generating hours that a plant can provide. The first goal was to discern inter-unit trends to
provide values for ݎଵǡ ܽ݊݀ݎଶǡ . Secondly it was necessary to choose three dispatch scenarios.
By analyzing unit operations data from 2000-2016. We notice that all four units at CHH have
had years of over 300 unit starts, years over 7000 generating hours, years under 100 unit starts,
and years under 4000 generating hours so there does not appear to be much unit preference.
Analyzing historic ݎଵǡ ܽ݊݀ݎଶǡ values, we see an average of തതതതതതതത
ݎଵǡுு ൌ ͳǤͺͻ and ݎതതതതതതതത
ଶǡுு ൌ ͳǤͶͲ.
To provide greater lenience in our model outcomes we increased these values to ݎଵǡுு ൌ ʹǤͲ
and ݎଶǡுு ൌ ͳǤͷ. Between 2000-2016 both NOH units have had years of over 550 unit starts,
years over 5700 operating hours, years under 100 unit starts, and years under 2000 operating
hours so there does not appear to be much unit preference. Analyzing historic ݎଵǡ ܽ݊݀ݎଶǡ
values, we see an average of തതതതതതതത
ݎଵǡேைு ൌ ͳǤͺ and തതതതതതതത
ݎଶǡேைு ൌ ͳǤͳ. Again these values were
slightly increased, this time to ݎଵǡேைு ൌ ͳǤͷ and ݎଶǡேைு ൌ ͳǤʹͷ.
The goal in selecting the three dispatch scenarios to use in the multicomponent conditional
reliability sensitivity analysis were to select dispatch cases for both CHH and NOH that
encountered low and high total generating hours and a significant change in total unit starts.
Additionally, it could be beneficial for the dispatch scenarios to be viewed as historical such that
the historical component age is significantly different in the Historical Reliability Analysis
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compared to the Future Reliability Analysis. CHH’s 2004 and 2006 operating years were
viewed as too similar and with NOH’s 2006 and 2007 operating years also very similar it was
decided to use 2004, 2005, and 2007 as our three dispatch scenarios.

4.2. Weibull Parameter Vectors
The determination of Weibull Parameters is paramount to the accuracy of the models. As
described previously, the shape and scale parameters will be unique to each component and are
determined using MLE which is dependent on the failure data and expert elicitation values
provided. This research also introduces a cyclic wear coefficient to relate the damage incurred
from unit cycling to the damage incurred from one generating hour. For the sensitivity analyses
we determined four parameter vectors for each of the three components studied by altering the
imitation TVA fleet outage values shown in Table 4-1. Although literature describes cyclic
damage for all three components, the stator windings were the only component where a cyclic
wear coefficient was found in literature. Therefore, the expert parameter vector has ܽଶǡట ൌ Ͳ
and ܽଷǡట ൌ Ͳ. The twelve parameter vectors are shown below in the format of equation 4-1 and
can be visualized in Figures 4-1 through 4-6.
[ 4-1 ]

ߠ ሺ߰ሻ ൌ ሾߙ ሺ߰ሻǡ ߚ ሺ߰ሻǡ ܽ ሺ߰ሻሿ݂ ݅ݎൌ ͳ ߰݀݊ܽ͵ݐൌ ͳݐͶ
ߠଵ ሺͳሻ ൌ ሾͷǤʹǡ ʹǤͶǡ ͲǤͺሿ; ߠଶ ሺͳሻ ൌ ሾͳͳͶǤ͵ǡ ʹǤͷͶǡ ͲǤͲͲሿ;ߠଷ ሺͳሻ ൌ ሾʹǤͶǡ ͻǤͲǡ ͲǤͲͲሿ
ߠଵ ሺʹሻ ൌ ሾͶ͵ǤͷͶǡ ͵Ǥͳʹǡ ͲǤͻ͵ሿ; ߠଶ ሺʹሻ ൌ ሾͺʹǤͳǡ ʹǤǡ ͲǤሿ; ߠଷ ሺʹሻ ൌ ሾ͵Ǥͻʹǡ ʹǤͻǡ ͲǤͲͲሿ
ߠଵ ሺ͵ሻ ൌ ሾ͵ͷǤͺǡ ʹǤͳͳǡ ͲǤͳሿ; ߠଶ ሺ͵ሻ ൌ ሾͷͲǤͶͻǡ ʹǤͳͶǡ ͳǤʹͺሿ; ߠଷ ሺ͵ሻ ൌ ሾͷ͵ǤͶͻǡ ʹǤǡ ͳǤ͵ͻሿ
ߠଵ ሺͶሻ ൌ ሾ͵ͺǤͺǡ ͵Ǥʹʹǡ ͷǤͲͲሿ; ߠଶ ሺͶሻ ൌ ሾͻͺǤʹǡ ʹǤͺͲǡ ͲǤͲͲሿ; ߠଷ ሺͶሻ ൌ ሾͷǤͲʹǡ ʹǤͲǡ ͲǤͲͲሿ

The failure scenarios ensured ߙǡଵ  ߙǡଶ  ߙǡଷ for all components. A significant decrease in the
shape parameter β seen in߰ ൌ ͵ will infringe on a utilities ability to effectively preempt forced
outages as this is a result of greater spread in the data. The changes in cyclic wear coefficient are
intriguing as these values will play a large role in determining the optimal unit dispatch patterns
that are the focus of RQ3 and RQ4 in sections 4.5 and 4.6.

Table 4-1 Failure Scenario Summary Data

Number of Failures per scenario.
109 suspensions per scenario not included.

Stator
Windings

Rotor
Windings

Kaplan Turbine
Runner

߱ሺ߰ ൌ ͳሻ

128

7

37

߱ሺ߰ ൌ ʹሻ

236

115

129

߱ሺ߰ ൌ ͵ሻ

345

224

238
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Figure 4-1 Stator Winding CDF
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Figure 4-2 Stator Winding pdf
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Rotor Windings Weibull CDF Curves
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Figure 4-3 Rotor Winding CDF
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Figure 4-4 Rotor Winding pdf
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Turbine Runner Weibull CDF Curves
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Figure 4-5 Kaplan Turbine Runner CDF
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Figure 4-6 Kaplan Turbine Runner pdf
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We must then verify the accuracy of these estimates by comparing the MLE results with other
parameter estimation techniques. RRX and RRY are commonly used for Weibull parameter
estimation (38). Three probability plotting techniques, median rank, mean rank and symmetric
rank were used for comparison as suggested by (38). We used the Stator Winding expert
elicitation to compare the methodology outlined above to six rank regression methods and MLE
outperforms all six in minimizing MSE. The MSE and resulting ߙ and ߚ are in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2 Expert Parameter Estimation Technique Comparison for Stator Windings

Parameter Estimation Method

α: scale

β: shape

Mean Squared Error

MLE of Artificial Failure Points

38.782

3.225

9.64E-04

Median Rank RRY

39.834

2.807

2.39E-03

Median Rank RRX

39.374

2.886

1.99E-03

Mean Rank RRY

39.923

2.738

2.79E-03

Mean Rank RRX

39.399

2.825

2.29E-03

Symmetric RRY

39.772

2.858

2.13E-03

Symmetric RRX

39.355

2.931

1.79E-03

4.3. Strategic Life Model
The SLM provides the asset manager the ability to convert a component’s parameter vector into
a strategic life that can be used in determining the total cost of operation and thus the price at
which a unit’s generating capacity is bid. The forecasted average dispatch patterns, ܽ, and
expected outage costs impact the strategic life of a component. Table 4-3 depicts the optimal
replacement time and the average component life for ݅ ൌ ͳ ͵ݐand ߰ ൌ ͳݐͶ. The difference
in the replacement interval and the average component life is highly dependent on β and CF. We
selected  ܨܥൌ ʹ for each component. The range between ߰ ൌ ͳܽ݊݀߰ ൌ ͵ provide a wide
range of possible cost outcomes for this component with ߰ ൌ ͳproviding the lower bound and
߰ ൌ ͵ providing the upper bound. The variation between ߰ ൌ ʹܽ݊݀߰ ൌ Ͷ shows a more
likely range of outcomes and possible room for improvement. The shape of the curve is a cost
function that reaches infinity as replacement interval approaches zero. The curve hits its
minimum and then approaches the run to failure cost.
Interestingly, for stator windings, the ܱܲଵ ሺʹሻ and ܱܲଵ ሺͶሻ are both lower than ܱܲଵ ሺ͵ሻ, yet ߰ ൌ
͵ has the shorter average life. This is influenced by the significant difference in the shape
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parameter that also results in a flatter shape for ߰ ൌ ͵. The difference between ܱܲଵ ሺʹሻ and
ܱܲଵ ሺͶሻ is a result of ߙଵ ሺʹሻ  ߙଵ ሺͶሻ while ߚଵ ሺʹሻ̱ߚଵ ሺͶሻ. The stator windings do show close
replacement timing harmony between ܱܲଵ ሺʹሻ, ܱܲଵ ሺ͵ሻ, ܱܲଵ ሺͶሻ as shown in Figure 4-7.
For rotor windings, the low value of ߚଶ ሺ͵ሻ which has led to a higher OP in the stator windings is
overcome by the low value of ߙଶ ሺ͵ሻ. The significant increase in the cost function of ߰ ൌ ͵
compared to the other failure scenarios, shown in Figure 4-8, is a result of nearly double the
amount of failures in ߰ ൌ ͵ compared to ߰ ൌ ʹ. Although the run to failure costs are lower for
rotor windings the 22% difference between ߰ ൌ ʹ and ߰ ൌ Ͷ is the largest of the components
thus making it very important to find the correct parameter vector for economic analyses. The
flatness of the curves however show that there is less opportunity cost forfeited by allowing rotor
windings to exceed the optimal replacement point than for other components.
The Kaplan turbine runners show the closest agreement in the cost curves, Figure 4-9, but there
is still a significant gap since ܱܲଷ ሺʹሻ െ ܱܲଷ ሺͶሻ  ൌ ͳͲǤʹ ܻܱܧand the difference in average life
is 9.18 EOY. Increased data acquisition will result in more accurate parameter vectors and
strategic life estimates. The majority of these curves are flatter after the optimal point which can
be interpreted as it being more strategic to be a year later on replacement than to be a year early
but not to the extent of rotor windings. These curves and ܱܲ ሺ߰ሻ are not meant to be used for
outage priority decisions as those decisions will be covered by the CRM once outage cost data is
collected. These curves allow us to more accurately predict average component life to be used in
operational cost estimates used in determining power service bids.
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Rotor Windings Strategic Life
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Figure 4-8 SLM Rotor Windings
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Figure 4-9 SLM Kaplan Turbine Runner
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Table 4-3 Strategic Life Model results of average component life

Failure Scenario
ൌ
ൌ
ൌ
ൌ

Optimal Replacement Point
50.1
34.8
36.7
30.8

Average Lifetime
41.43
31.31
27.49
27.94

Rotor

ൌ
ൌ
ൌ
ൌ

100.0
69.2
50.7
82.0

83.61
59.85
38.45
71.24

Turbine

ൌ
ൌ
ൌ
ൌ

80.7
53.3
45.6
63.5

69.58
46.27
38.45
54.45

Stator

4.4. Single Component Conditional Reliability Model
The results of the single component CRM allow asset managers to visualize the potential risk
incurred for various dispatch patterns specific to a unit’s operating history. When budgetary
constraints prevent replacement work from occurring in the current year, visualizing the
component level risk of failure allows asset managers to understand the risk-cost they are
incurring and determine a plan for minimizing this risk cost by decreasing operations at this unit.
Since these results vary based on the current age of the component, CHH4 will be used for all
݇ǡ ߰ scenarios for kൌ ͳ ͵ݐand ߰ ൌ ͳݐͶ because of its significant work at HMOD that
enables more accurate ܶǡǡ ሺ߰ሻ.
When ܽ ሺ߰ሻ ൌ Ͳ, as it does for five of the twelve parameter vectors, we see flat risk lines since
risk of failure only increases with generating hours and not with unit starts. No risk map is
steeper than ߠଵ ሺͶሻ as ܽଵ ሺͶሻ ൌ ͷǤͲ which is 3.57 times greater than the next ܽ ሺ߰ሻ. The risk
maps also show that the stator windings and rotor windings at CHH4 are roughly two to four
times as likely to fail as Kaplan turbine runners based on the different ߠ ሺ߰ሻ. The relative age of
the stator and rotor windings will therefore guide future dispatch decisions more than the Kaplan
turbine runner ages in sections 4.5 and 4.6.
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Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Stator Windings ߰=1
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Figure 4-10 Stator Winding Risk of Failure  ൌ 

Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Stator Windings ߰=2
0.042
7000
6750
6500
6250
6000
5750
5500
5250
5000
4750
4500
4250
4000

Risk of Failure

0.038
0.034
0.030
0.026
0.022
100

200

300

400

Unit Starts
Figure 4-11 Stator Winding Risk of Failure  ൌ 
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Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Stator Windings ߰=3
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Figure 4-12 Stator Winding Risk of Failure  ൌ 

Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Stator Windings ߰=4
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Figure 4-13 Stator Winding Risk of Failure  ൌ 
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Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Rotor Windings ߰=1
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Figure 4-14 Rotor Winding Risk of Failure  ൌ 

Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Rotor Windings ߰=2
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Figure 4-15 Rotor Winding Risk of Failure  ൌ 
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Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Rotor Windings ߰=3
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Figure 4-16 Rotor Winding Risk of Failure  ൌ 

Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Rotor Windings ߰=4
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Figure 4-17 Rotor Winding Risk of Failure  ൌ 
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Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Kaplan Turbine Runner ߰=1
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Figure 4-18 Kaplan Turbine Runner Risk of Failure  ൌ 

Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Kaplan Turbine Runner ߰=2
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Figure 4-19 Kaplan Turbine Runner Risk of Failure  ൌ 
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Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16
for Kaplan Turbine Runner ߰=3
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Figure 4-20 Kaplan Turbine Runner Risk of Failure  ൌ 

Risk of Failure: CHH Unit 4 through 9/21/16 for
Kaplan Turbine Runner ߰=4
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Figure 4-21 Kaplan Turbine Runner Risk of Failure  ൌ 
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4.5. Historical Reliability Analysis
By reviewing historical operations and running the model set to each of these historical ages we
can determine the deviation from actual operations that would have needed to occur to maximize
reliability. This enables the calculation of a reliability index, RI. To determine the sensitivity of
the multicomponent CRM the model was run using ߠ ሺʹሻ and ߠ ሺͶሻ for CHH & NOH in
historical years 2004, 2005, & 2007. Table 4-4 shows the quantitative results for ߰ ൌ ʹ while
Table 4-5 shows the quantitative results for ߰ ൌ Ͷ.
For 2004, ߰ ൌ ʹ agrees with ߰ ൌ Ͷ with how best to dispatch generating hours. However, they
disagree on how unit starts should be distributed. This is a result of the significant differences in
cyclic wear coefficients ܽ ሺ߰ሻ where ߰ ൌ ʹ spreads cyclic wear to all components yet ߰ ൌ Ͷ
suggests that only the stator windings incur this cyclic wear. In actuality, NOH unit starts were
distributed in excess of ݎଵǡேைு , but ߰ ൌ Ͷ was going in the correct direction.
For 2005, ߰ ൌ ʹ again agrees with ߰ ൌ Ͷ with how best to dispatch generating hours and ߰ ൌ Ͷ
is very similar to the actual dispatch of unit starts at NOH. As in 2004, the unit starts at CHH3 &
4 are suppressed in ߰ ൌ Ͷ due to the relative ages of ܶுுǡଷǡଵ ሺͶሻ and ܶுுǡସǡଵ ሺͶሻ to other stator
windings. In ߰ ൌ ʹ the reliability of other components overrides the advanced age of
ܶுுǡସǡଵ ሺʹሻ leading to CHH4 being recommended for an increase in unit starts.
For 2005, ߰ ൌ ʹ again agrees with ߰ ൌ Ͷ with how best to dispatch generating hours. There is
significant difference in how the models recommend the unit starts are distributed. Both ߰ ൌ ʹ
and ߰ ൌ Ͷ show that the unit starts at NOH should be concentrated at one unit but disagree as to
which unit should handle the majority. This is a common theme with all dispatch scenarios.
The plant’s reliability index, ܴܫ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ can be used to measure the reliability of actual operations
compared to optimal dispatch and to worst case dispatch. The worst-case dispatch values were
determined by minimizing the reliability function while maintaining all bounds and are found in
Table 4-6. RI ranges from 0-100 if all optimization constraints are met during actual operation.
ܴܫேைு ሺͶǡͳሻ exceeds a value of 100 because actual operation violated the unit start ratio ݎଵǡேைு .

Table 4-4 Historical Recommendation for  ൌ 

߰=2
CHH1
CHH2
CHH3
CHH4
NOH1
NOH2

Dispatch Scenario 1
Dispatch Scenario 2
Dispatch Scenario 3
ሬԦǡ 
ሬԦǡ Rj,max Ri,max ሬԦǡ ሬԦǡ Rj,max Ri,max ሬԦǡ 
ሬԦǡ Rj,max Ri,max

5760 168 .9625 .8495 5977 241 .9585 .8380 4831 141 .9635 .8820
5377 167 .9550
5408 241 .9522
3221 88 .9691
5377 168 .9643
5408 247 .9621
3221 168 .9746
8066 335 .9584
8113 481 .9542
4831 175 .9691
4360 167 .9790 .9555 3647 229 .9812 .9596 2664 341 .9843 .9657
5449 291 .9761
4559 400 .9780
3331 598 .9811
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Table 4-5 Historical Recommendation for  ൌ 

ൌ
CHH1
CHH2
CHH3
CHH4
NOH1
NOH2

Dispatch Scenario 1
ሬԦǡ 
ሬԦǡ Rj,max Ri,max

5650 278 .9752 .8973
5408 276 .9696
5410 145 .9761
8112 139 .9721
4360 291 .9869 .9711
5449 167 .9840

Dispatch Scenario 2
ሬԦǡ 
ሬԦǡ Rj,max Ri,max

5744 403 .9732 .8893
5249 403 .9689
6041 202 .9719
7873 202 .9703
3647 400 .9881 .9735
4559 229 .9853

Dispatch Scenario 3
ሬԦǡ 
ሬԦǡ Rj,max Ri,max

4772 188 .9754 .9183
3182 188 .9792
3377 103 .9822
4772 94 .9789
2772 598 .9890 .9764
3223 341 .9873

For CHH the RI as are follows for the three dispatch scenarios and used two failure scenarios:
ܴܫுு ሺʹǡͳሻ ൌ ͻʹǤͲǢܴܫுு ሺʹǡʹሻ ൌ ͻʹǤͷͶǢܴܫுு ሺʹǡ͵ሻ ൌ ͻǤ͵ʹ
ܴܫுு ሺͶǡͳሻ ൌ ͻͳǤͺͻǢܴܫுு ሺͶǡʹሻ ൌ ͻʹǤ͵ͳǢܴܫுு ሺͶǡ͵ሻ ൌ ͻǤʹͲ
For NOH the RI as are follows for the three dispatch scenarios and used two failure scenarios:
ܴܫேைு ሺʹǡͳሻ ൌ ǤͺͲǢܴ ܫேைு ሺʹǡʹሻ ൌ ͵͵ǤʹͷǢܴܫேைு ሺʹǡ͵ሻ ൌ ͺǤͲͲ
ܴܫேைு ሺͶǡͳሻ ൌ ͳʹǤͲǢܴ ܫேைு ሺͶǡʹሻ ൌ ͺͳǤ͵͵Ǣܴ ܫேைு ሺͶǡ͵ሻ ൌ ͻǤͳͶ
This shows that CHH was operated close to the optimal dispatch for reliability purposes.
However, NOH was not consistent in their RI values. The need for minimum flows at a 2-unit
facility like NOH can make optimizing reliable operations difficult, yet these are the facilities
that stand the most to gain from reliable operations.

Table 4-6 Minimal possible values for Historic Reliability

R1,min(,1) R1,min(,2) R1,min(,3) R2,min(,1)
.7978
.7857
.7705
.9550
ൌ
.8603
.8516
.8368
.9708
ൌ

R2,min(,2) R2,min(,3)
.9592
.9653
.9732
.9759

4.6. Future CRM Analysis
The next use for the model is to determine how CHH and NOH units should have been
dispatched at the present time if specific historical hydrologic years were repeated. Table 4-7
shows the raw data values while Figures 4-22 through 4-27 present a graphical view.
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The results for CHH are greatly influenced by the parameter vector and the current component
ages. The models agree that generating hours should be distributed first to CHH4 and CHH1
with a wide gap before CHH3 and CHH2. The sensitivity analysis shows that the unit start
distribution is not as simple. ߰ ൌ ʹ shows a near equal distribution of unit starts while ߰ ൌ ͳ
and ߰ ൌ Ͷ agree that CHH1 and CHH2 should be used for cyclic operations. ߰ ൌ ͵ deviates
and suggests CHH4 take the majority of unit starts. This is caused by all components having
non-zero cyclic wear coefficients.
The results for NOH show good agreement in dispatching NOH1 with more hours and more unit
starts which culminates in a lower average run time for NOH1 than NOH2. The results deviate
in ߰ ൌ ͵ as all three components have non-zero cyclic wear coefficients. This shifts the brunt of
unit starts to NOH2 while still burdening NOH1 with the larger amount of generating hours.
The reliability values for CHH are significantly below those of NOH. The variation in ܴ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ
is due to the size of the system doubling. The differences in ܴுுǡ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ and ܴேைுǡ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ
values are due to the differences in component ages. Dispatch totals vary by plant and dispatch
scenario and affect both ܴ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ and ܴǡ ሺ߰ǡ ݏሻ.
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Table 4-7 CHH & NOH Dispatch Recommendations

ൌ
CHH1
CHH2
CHH3
CHH4
NOH1
NOH2
ൌ
CHH1
CHH2
CHH3
CHH4
NOH1
NOH2
ൌ
CHH1
CHH2
CHH3
CHH4
NOH1
NOH2
ൌ
CHH1
CHH2
CHH3
CHH4
NOH1
NOH2

Dispatch Case 1
ሬԦǡ Rj,max Ri,max


Dispatch Case 2
ሬԦǡ Rj,max Ri,max


Dispatch Case 3
ሬԦǡ Rj,max Ri,max


ሬԦǡ
7363
4919
4919
7379
5449
4360

ሬԦǡ
279 .9448 .8263 7247
278 .9602
4996
142 .9616
5170
139 .9472
7493
291 .9758 .9550 4559
167 .9787
3647

ሬԦǡ
307 .9456 .8234 4831
304 .9596
3221
301 .9593
3221
298 .9460
4831
400 .9796 .9621 3331
229 .9821
2664

191
191
95
95
598
341

.9638 .8834
.9739
.9749
.9655
.9849 .9718
.9867

ሬԦǡ
6839
5044
5131
7566
5449
4360

Rj,max Ri,max

ሬԦǡ
212 .8922 .6595 6916
208 .9112
5121
209 .9136
5188
210 .8880
7681
291 .9496 .9096 4559
167 .9579
3647

Rj,max Ri,max

ሬԦǡ
308 .8900 .6530 4433
298 .9088
3327
301 .9117
3353
303 .8854
4990
400 .9569 .9226 3331
229 .9642
2664

ሬԦǡ


Rj,max Ri,max

145
142
142
143
598
341

.9294 .7634
.9409
.9431
.9256
.9666 .9403
.9727

ሬԦǡ

7284
4942
4942
7412
5449
4360

Rj,max Ri,max

ሬԦǡ

159 .7974 .4603 6999
159 .8473
5116
203 .8508
5116
317 .8008
7674
167 .8854 .7998 4559
291 .9033
3647

Rj,max Ri,max

ሬԦǡ

379 .7984 .4499 4824
208 .8409
3222
208 .8459
3222
416 .7922
4834
229 .9015 .8251 3331
400 .9153
2664

ሬԦǡ


Rj,max Ri,max

115
114
114
229
341
598

.8614 .6031
.8977
.9010
.8656
.9234 .8596
.9309

ሬԦǡ
7374
4916
4916
7374
5449
4360

Rj,max Ri,max

ሬԦǡ
237 .9124 .7305 7354
280 .9346
4997
182 .9368
5061
140 .9144
7495
291 .9601 .9246 4559
167 .9630
3647

Rj,max Ri,max

ሬԦǡ
352 .9106 .7215 4830
318 .9330
3221
284 .9330
3221
256 .9102
4831
400 .9649 .9336 3331
229 .9675
2664

ሬԦǡ

Rj,max Ri,max

166
194
115
97
598
341

.9423 .8158
.9569
.9586
.9438
.9710 .9449
.9731

ሬԦǡ


ሬԦǡ


ሬԦǡ

ሬԦǡ


ሬԦǡ


ሬԦǡ
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Generating Hours Distribution s = 1
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Figure 4-22 CRM Generating Hours Distribution s = 1

Unit Start Distribution s = 1
CHH 1
400
300
NOH 2

200

CHH 2

100
0

NOH 1

c(1,1)

CHH 3

CHH 4
c(2,1)
c(3,1)

c(4,1)

Figure 4-23 CRM Unit Starts Distribution s = 1
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Generating Hours Distribution s = 2
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Figure 4-24 CRM Generating Hours Distribution s = 2
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Figure 4-25 CRM Unit Starts Distribution s = 2
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Generating Hours Distribution s = 3
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Figure 4-26 CRM Generating Hours Distribution s = 3
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Figure 4-27 CRM Unit Starts Distribution s = 3
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5. Conclusions and Future Work
The sensitivity analyses show that our model will adapt to fit the data acquired from utilities.
The failure data will mold the parameter vectors using the expert elicitation as a baseline and will
increase in weight as additional data is acquired. The SLM, single component CRM, and
multicomponent CRM have shown they can be used to inform Asset Managers of reliability
leaning decisions. The RI can be used to justify dispatch patterns that focus more on efficiency
or other operating goals and are sub-optimal with respect to reliability.
This research establishes the EOH/EOY approach to risk-reliability calculations for hydroelectric
powertrain components that is necessary to quantify the total cost of a unit cycle. As additional
components are added to the model and outage data is acquired, this calculation will become
possible. The value to cost ratio for unit starts is currently not a well-informed area and future
work in this area can help establish better understanding using the outlined methodology.
The immediate horizon for future work is to scale the model to increase the number of
components and to optimize dispatch patterns for an entire fleet. Optimizing a fleet, the size of
TVA’s 109-unit, 29-plant fleet for 10 components of interest shows the scale of the problem now
that a three component, four-unit plant can be optimized. The multicomponent CRM developed
in this work can, in future research, be used to compare the optimal dispatch patterns for meeting
specific needs. In this work, we focused on maximizing reliability. One could also choose to
minimize the risk-cost incurred or weight the units based on efficiency or other metrics of
import. This model also assumes that all units at a plant have similar generating capabilities.
Future work will adapt this model to perform at plants where units vary in generating capacity.
Future work also includes establishing RI values for the TVA fleet for the past decade to
establish pareto distribution curves for the relationship between RI and an efficiency metric.
These metrics should transcend MW, hydraulic head and other grouping variables. However, in
order to achieve this, ݎଵǡ and ݎଶǡ must be set the historic ratio for each operating year to prevent
RI values in excess of 100 instead of setting one value based on all historic dispatch.
Communicating to system operators the importance of small interval on-line operating data and
outage data will be a continued effort and this research can be used as an example of the
importance of data collection and the knowledge that can be extracted from this. Future work
will include obtaining TVA outage history and using that information to inform the Weibull
parameter vectors that govern the reliability calculations. Small interval on-line operating data
can provide information on ramp events in order for a ramp event covariate to be added to the
model.
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